Uprava državne bezbednosti/sigurnosti/varnosti or UDBA (Serbian Cyrillic: Управа државне безбедности, УДБА; Macedonian Cyrillic: Управа за државна безбедност, УДБА; literally: State Security Administration) was the secret police organization of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is alleged that the UDBA was responsible for the eliminations of dozens of enemies of the state within Yugoslavia and internationally (estimates about 200 eliminations and kidnappings). Eliminations vary from those of notorious war criminals (e.g. Vjekoslav "Maks" Luburić and Ante Pavelić) in Spain and Argentina to those of the Croatian emigrant and secessionist Bruno Bušić on October 16, 1978 in Paris.
Functions
The UDBA formed a major part of the Yugoslav intelligence services during 1946-1991 period, primarily responsible for internal state-security. After 1946 the State Security Administration (UDB) underwent numerous security and intelligence changes due to topical issues at that time, including: fighting gangs; protection of the economy; Cominform/Informbiro; and bureaucratic aspirations. In 1945 and 1946, for instance, the UDB was organized into districts. In 1950, when the administrative-territorial units were abolished as authorities, the UDB was reorganized again. During this period the intelligence and security activities concentrated less on intelligence and more on internal security. There was an emphasis on collectivism, brotherhood, social harmony, loyalty, and tolerance towards those with different views. Deviation from this set of values became an immediate issue for security services.
Later, the use of force was mitigated and when the process of "decentralization of people's power" began, intelligence and security services underwent further reorganization in order to deconcentrate power and increase effectiveness. The Act on Internal Affairs and the Decree on Organization of State Internal Affairs Secretariat regulated the intelligence security authority as the prerogative of the State Security Directorate within the Ministry of the Interior. The following reorganization addressed issues relating to the competence of the federation (state security, cross-border traffic, foreign citizens, passports, introduction and dissemination of foreign press, and federal citizenship).
Structure
Intelligence and security activity was organized in the following manner:
After OZNA (Одељење заштите народа / Odeljenje zaštite naroda) was abolished, intelligence activity was divided among various federal ministries: the Federal Ministry of the Interior by the State Security Administration; and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Service of Investigation and Documentation (SID), which collected foreign political information; military-defense intelligence was handled by the GS 2nd Department- KOS (Kontraobavještajna služba/ Counterintelligence Service) of Yugoslav People's Army.
SDB in the republics was not autonomous, but was tied to the federal service which co-ordinated the work and issued instructions.
State security was regulated by secret legislation (secret Official Gazette), which prescribed the use of special operations. The SDB performed house searches, covert interceptions inside the premises, telecommunications interception, covert surveillance of people, and covert interception of letters and other consignments.
Of primary interest to the SDB was the domestic - identifying and obstructing activities of the "domestic enemy" (i.e. the "bourgeois rightwing", clericalists, members of the Cominform, nationalists, and separatists). Intelligence work abroad was deemed less important and was under federal control.
The SDB was a "political police", answerable to the party organization from which it received its guidelines and to which it reported. The SDB was so deeply rooted in the political system that one of its tasks was the preparation of "Political Security Assessments"; that is, assessments on literally all spheres of life.
During its activity, the SDB enjoyed a wide range of power, including classical police powers (identifications, interrogations, and arrests).
The SDB organization was constantly changing and making improvements, but it remained tied to the central unit in republic capitals and smaller working groups in the field. All information and data flowed into the central unit in the capitals and sent on from there to the users. Field groups had working contacts with the local authorities, but did not answer to them.
Functions
The UDBA formed a major part of the Yugoslav intelligence services during 1946-1991 period, primarily responsible for internal state-security. After 1946 the State Security Administration (UDB) underwent numerous security and intelligence changes due to topical issues at that time, including: fighting gangs; protection of the economy; Cominform/Informbiro; and bureaucratic aspirations. In 1945 and 1946, for instance, the UDB was organized into districts. In 1950, when the administrative-territorial units were abolished as authorities, the UDB was reorganized again. During this period the intelligence and security activities concentrated less on intelligence and more on internal security. There was an emphasis on collectivism, brotherhood, social harmony, loyalty, and tolerance towards those with different views. Deviation from this set of values became an immediate issue for security services.
Later, the use of force was mitigated and when the process of "decentralization of people's power" began, intelligence and security services underwent further reorganization in order to deconcentrate power and increase effectiveness. The Act on Internal Affairs and the Decree on Organization of State Internal Affairs Secretariat regulated the intelligence security authority as the prerogative of the State Security Directorate within the Ministry of the Interior. The following reorganization addressed issues relating to the competence of the federation (state security, cross-border traffic, foreign citizens, passports, introduction and dissemination of foreign press, and federal citizenship).
Structure
Intelligence and security activity was organized in the following manner:
After OZNA (Одељење заштите народа / Odeljenje zaštite naroda) was abolished, intelligence activity was divided among various federal ministries: the Federal Ministry of the Interior by the State Security Administration; and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Service of Investigation and Documentation (SID), which collected foreign political information; military-defense intelligence was handled by the GS 2nd Department- KOS (Kontraobavještajna služba/ Counterintelligence Service) of Yugoslav People's Army.
SDB in the republics was not autonomous, but was tied to the federal service which co-ordinated the work and issued instructions.
State security was regulated by secret legislation (secret Official Gazette), which prescribed the use of special operations. The SDB performed house searches, covert interceptions inside the premises, telecommunications interception, covert surveillance of people, and covert interception of letters and other consignments.
Of primary interest to the SDB was the domestic - identifying and obstructing activities of the "domestic enemy" (i.e. the "bourgeois rightwing", clericalists, members of the Cominform, nationalists, and separatists). Intelligence work abroad was deemed less important and was under federal control.
The SDB was a "political police", answerable to the party organization from which it received its guidelines and to which it reported. The SDB was so deeply rooted in the political system that one of its tasks was the preparation of "Political Security Assessments"; that is, assessments on literally all spheres of life.
During its activity, the SDB enjoyed a wide range of power, including classical police powers (identifications, interrogations, and arrests).
The SDB organization was constantly changing and making improvements, but it remained tied to the central unit in republic capitals and smaller working groups in the field. All information and data flowed into the central unit in the capitals and sent on from there to the users. Field groups had working contacts with the local authorities, but did not answer to them.
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