In Chechnya
The force was active in the First Chechen War where the unit was used as light infantry and in the notorious "mopping-up" operations (zachistka). In February 1996, a group of 37 officers of the Novosibirsk OMON were captured by the Chechen militants during the Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye hostage crisis; 17 of them were later swapped for the Chechen fighters captured in the same incident. In August 1996, group of 30 Chechen OMON members answering to Said-Magomed Kakiyev were reportedly captured and executed in Grozny, the Chechen capital, during the battle for the city.
OMON is active in the Second Chechen War. Almost every Russian city sends, on a regular basis, small units of police (often composed of OMON members) for tours of duty in Chechnya lasting several months, while the Chechen Republic also formed its own OMON detachment. The force sustained heavy losses in the second conflict as well, including from the March 2000 ambush which killed more than 30 OMON servicemen from Perm (including nine captured and executed), the July 2000 suicide bombing which inflicted more than 100 casualties at the Chelyabinsk OMON base in Argun, and the April 2002 attack which killed 21 Chechen OMON troops in central Grozny.
Control and discipline is questionable in Chechnya, where the members of the group were noted to engage in or fall victim of several deadly friendly fire and fratricide incidents. In the bloodiest incident, at least 24 Russian OMON officers were killed and more than 30 wounded when two units (from Podolsk and Sergiyev Posad) fired on each other in Grozny on March 2, 2000. Among other incidents, several Chechen OMON servicemen were abducted and executed in Grozny by the Russian military servicemen in November 2000, members of the Chechen OMON clashed with the Ingush police on the Chechen-Ingush border resulting in eight fatalities and about 20 injuries in September 2006, and the Ramzan Kadyrov-controlled Chechen OMON clashed with a group of rival Chechens belonging to the Kakiyev's GRU commando unit in Grozny, resulting in five dead and several wounded in 2007.
In the course of the Chechen conflict the OMON was accused of severe human rights abuses, including abducting, torturing and killing civilians. As of 2000, the bulk of war crimes recorded by international organisations in Chechnya appeared to have been committed by the OMON. An OMON detachment from Moscow region took part in the April 1995 rampage in the village of Samashki, during which up to 300 civilians were reportedly killed in the result of a "cleansing operation" conducted there by the MVD forces. The OMON unit from Saint Petersburg is also believed to be behind the Novye Aldi massacre in which at least 60 civilians were robbed and then killed by the Russian forces entering Grozny in February 2000; one officer, Sergei Babin, was reported to be prosecuted in relation to the case in 2005 and then to disappear. In 1999 a group of unidentified OMON members shot dead around 40 refugees fleeing Grozny.
In April 2006, the European Court of Human Rights found Russia guilty of the forced disappearance of Shakhid Baysayev, a Chechen man who had gone missing after being detained in a March 2000 security sweep by the Russian OMON in Grozny. In 2007, the Khanty-Mansi OMON officer Sergei Lapin was sentenced for kidnapping and torture of a Chechen man in Grozny in 2001, with the Grozny court criticising the conduct of the OMON serving in Chechnya in broader terms. In an event related to the conflict in Chechnya, several OMON officers were accused of starting the May 2007 wave of the ethnic violence in Stavropol by assisting in the racist murder of a local Chechen man.
Before and early during the First and Second Chechen Wars, there were also OMON formations belonging the Interior Ministry of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Chechnya's separatist government.
OMON in Russia
Information from different sources suggests that there were between 10,500 and 15,000 OMON members stationed at population centers and transportation hubs around the country in the 1990s, yet by 2007 this number officially rose to about 20,000 nationwide (as referenced to as Innner Armed Forces). Members receive a comparatively small salary of about $700 per month in Moscow (regional units offer less). Most members retire at the age of approximately 45 years, and receive practically no financial aid from the state afterwards. They are also sometimes not paid for their service (in 2001, for example, some 50 OMON members from Moscow filed the lawsuit claiming they were not paid for one month of combat operations in Chechnya[32]). Due to the use of OMON members in high risk situations, especially in Chechnya and elsewhere in North Caucasus, the group often loses members in combat.
Members of OMON are supposed to be extremely fit and experts in small arms and hand-to-hand combat. Males between the ages of 22 and 30 who have completed their two-year military service can apply to join OMON (the application includes medical and psychological tests, and tests of speed and fitness). The initial training lasts for four months. The applicants are extensively trained in the use of different weaponry and close combat, and are also trained to follow orders at any cost. Special emphasis is put on urban combat and the entering and clearing of buildings. The training also includes legal training. The application procedure closes with a final test, where the applicant has to fight three to five trained members of OMON by hand wearing boxing gloves. Fewer than one in five applicants pass and are selected to join.
The OMON groups use a wide range of weapons, including but not limited to AK-74 assault rifle, AKS-74U carbine assault rifle, 9A-91 compact assault rifle, and PP-19 Bizon submachine gun. OMON units during a combat operations may also use other weaponry typical for the Russian light infantry (the OMON troops in Chechnya were sometimes called "OMON soldiers" in the reports,[33] especially in the so-called active phases of the conflict), such as the PK machine gun, the GP-25 underbarrel grenade launcher for AK-74 or the GM-94 pump-action grenade launcher, and the Dragunov and Vintorez sniper rifles.
OMON vehicles include specially-equipped vans, buses and trucks of various types, as well as limited number of armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60, BTR-70 and BTR-80). OMON's headgear remains a black beret (they are thus sometimes called "Black Berets") although otherwise there were significant changes in uniform and insignia. The group members often use the blue urban camouflage uniforms and black face masks while on duty, and various Russian Army and Internal Troops uniforms while in Chechnya. OMON of the Chechen Republic also frequently wear American-made military uniforms similar to these often used by the separatist fighters.
The force was active in the First Chechen War where the unit was used as light infantry and in the notorious "mopping-up" operations (zachistka). In February 1996, a group of 37 officers of the Novosibirsk OMON were captured by the Chechen militants during the Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye hostage crisis; 17 of them were later swapped for the Chechen fighters captured in the same incident. In August 1996, group of 30 Chechen OMON members answering to Said-Magomed Kakiyev were reportedly captured and executed in Grozny, the Chechen capital, during the battle for the city.
OMON is active in the Second Chechen War. Almost every Russian city sends, on a regular basis, small units of police (often composed of OMON members) for tours of duty in Chechnya lasting several months, while the Chechen Republic also formed its own OMON detachment. The force sustained heavy losses in the second conflict as well, including from the March 2000 ambush which killed more than 30 OMON servicemen from Perm (including nine captured and executed), the July 2000 suicide bombing which inflicted more than 100 casualties at the Chelyabinsk OMON base in Argun, and the April 2002 attack which killed 21 Chechen OMON troops in central Grozny.
Control and discipline is questionable in Chechnya, where the members of the group were noted to engage in or fall victim of several deadly friendly fire and fratricide incidents. In the bloodiest incident, at least 24 Russian OMON officers were killed and more than 30 wounded when two units (from Podolsk and Sergiyev Posad) fired on each other in Grozny on March 2, 2000. Among other incidents, several Chechen OMON servicemen were abducted and executed in Grozny by the Russian military servicemen in November 2000, members of the Chechen OMON clashed with the Ingush police on the Chechen-Ingush border resulting in eight fatalities and about 20 injuries in September 2006, and the Ramzan Kadyrov-controlled Chechen OMON clashed with a group of rival Chechens belonging to the Kakiyev's GRU commando unit in Grozny, resulting in five dead and several wounded in 2007.
In the course of the Chechen conflict the OMON was accused of severe human rights abuses, including abducting, torturing and killing civilians. As of 2000, the bulk of war crimes recorded by international organisations in Chechnya appeared to have been committed by the OMON. An OMON detachment from Moscow region took part in the April 1995 rampage in the village of Samashki, during which up to 300 civilians were reportedly killed in the result of a "cleansing operation" conducted there by the MVD forces. The OMON unit from Saint Petersburg is also believed to be behind the Novye Aldi massacre in which at least 60 civilians were robbed and then killed by the Russian forces entering Grozny in February 2000; one officer, Sergei Babin, was reported to be prosecuted in relation to the case in 2005 and then to disappear. In 1999 a group of unidentified OMON members shot dead around 40 refugees fleeing Grozny.
In April 2006, the European Court of Human Rights found Russia guilty of the forced disappearance of Shakhid Baysayev, a Chechen man who had gone missing after being detained in a March 2000 security sweep by the Russian OMON in Grozny. In 2007, the Khanty-Mansi OMON officer Sergei Lapin was sentenced for kidnapping and torture of a Chechen man in Grozny in 2001, with the Grozny court criticising the conduct of the OMON serving in Chechnya in broader terms. In an event related to the conflict in Chechnya, several OMON officers were accused of starting the May 2007 wave of the ethnic violence in Stavropol by assisting in the racist murder of a local Chechen man.
Before and early during the First and Second Chechen Wars, there were also OMON formations belonging the Interior Ministry of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Chechnya's separatist government.
OMON in Russia
Information from different sources suggests that there were between 10,500 and 15,000 OMON members stationed at population centers and transportation hubs around the country in the 1990s, yet by 2007 this number officially rose to about 20,000 nationwide (as referenced to as Innner Armed Forces). Members receive a comparatively small salary of about $700 per month in Moscow (regional units offer less). Most members retire at the age of approximately 45 years, and receive practically no financial aid from the state afterwards. They are also sometimes not paid for their service (in 2001, for example, some 50 OMON members from Moscow filed the lawsuit claiming they were not paid for one month of combat operations in Chechnya[32]). Due to the use of OMON members in high risk situations, especially in Chechnya and elsewhere in North Caucasus, the group often loses members in combat.
Members of OMON are supposed to be extremely fit and experts in small arms and hand-to-hand combat. Males between the ages of 22 and 30 who have completed their two-year military service can apply to join OMON (the application includes medical and psychological tests, and tests of speed and fitness). The initial training lasts for four months. The applicants are extensively trained in the use of different weaponry and close combat, and are also trained to follow orders at any cost. Special emphasis is put on urban combat and the entering and clearing of buildings. The training also includes legal training. The application procedure closes with a final test, where the applicant has to fight three to five trained members of OMON by hand wearing boxing gloves. Fewer than one in five applicants pass and are selected to join.
The OMON groups use a wide range of weapons, including but not limited to AK-74 assault rifle, AKS-74U carbine assault rifle, 9A-91 compact assault rifle, and PP-19 Bizon submachine gun. OMON units during a combat operations may also use other weaponry typical for the Russian light infantry (the OMON troops in Chechnya were sometimes called "OMON soldiers" in the reports,[33] especially in the so-called active phases of the conflict), such as the PK machine gun, the GP-25 underbarrel grenade launcher for AK-74 or the GM-94 pump-action grenade launcher, and the Dragunov and Vintorez sniper rifles.
OMON vehicles include specially-equipped vans, buses and trucks of various types, as well as limited number of armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60, BTR-70 and BTR-80). OMON's headgear remains a black beret (they are thus sometimes called "Black Berets") although otherwise there were significant changes in uniform and insignia. The group members often use the blue urban camouflage uniforms and black face masks while on duty, and various Russian Army and Internal Troops uniforms while in Chechnya. OMON of the Chechen Republic also frequently wear American-made military uniforms similar to these often used by the separatist fighters.
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