Jus ad bellum (Latin for "right to wage war"; see also Just War) are a set of criteria that are consulted before engaging in war, in order to determine whether entering into war is justifiable. Jus ad bellum is sometimes considered a part of the laws of war, although the term "laws of war" can also be considered to refer to jus in bello, which concerns whether a war is conducted justly (regardless of whether the initiation of hostilities was just). See G. E. M. Anscombe. An international agreement limiting the justifiable reasons for a country to declare war against another is concerned with jus ad bellum. In addition to bilateral non-aggression pacts, the twentieth century saw multilateral treaties defining entirely new restrictions against going to war. The three most notable examples are the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war as an instrument of national policy, the London Charter (known also as the Nuremberg Charter) defining "crimes against peace" as one of three major categories of international crime to be prosecuted after World War II, and the United Nations Charter, which binds nations to seek resolution of disputes by peaceful means and requires authorization by the United Nations before a nation may initiate any use of force against another, beyond repulsing an immediate armed attack against its sovereign territory. By contrast, agreements defining limits on acceptable conduct while already engaged in war are considered "rules of war" and are referred to as the jus in bello. Thus the Geneva Conventions are a set of "jus in bello". Doctrines concerning the protection of civilians in wartime, or the need for "proportionality" when force is used, are addressed to issues of conduct within a war, but the same doctrines can also shed light on the question of when it is lawful (or unlawful) to go to war in the first place. These terms are used in discussions of international law and philosophy. According to Robert Kolb: The august solemnity of Latin confers on the terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello the misleading appearance of being centuries old. In fact, these expressions were only coined at the time of the League of Nations and were rarely used in doctrine or practice until after the Second World War, in the late 1940s to be precise By this Kolb means that the terms themselves as legal terms, and the subdivision of the doctrine of just war into the branches jus ad bellum and jus in bello, are recent. The concept of just war and the term bellum justum dates to St. Augustine of Hippo in the fifth century.
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Casus belli
Historical examples This section outlines a number of the more famous or controversial cases of casus belli which have occurred in modern times. World War I A political assassination provided the trigger that led to the outbreak of World War I. In June 1914, the Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria at Sarajevo in Austria-Hungary by Gavrilo Princip, a Serbian nationalist from Bosnia, Austrian subject and member of Young Bosnia, was used by Austria-Hungary as a casus belli for declaring war on Serbia. The Russian Empire started to mobilise its troops in defence of its ally Serbia, which resulted in the German Empire declaring war on Russia in support of its ally Austria-Hungary. Very quickly, after the involvement of France, the Ottoman Empire and the British Empire, five of the six great European powers became involved in the first European general war since the Napoleonic Wars. World War II In his autobiography Mein Kampf, Adolf Hitler had advocated in the 1920s a policy of lebensraum ("living space") for the German people, which in practical terms meant German territorial expansion into Eastern Europe. In August 1939, in order to implement the first phase of this policy, Germany's Nazi government under Hitler's leadership staged the Gleiwitz incident, which was used as a casus belli for the invasion of Poland the following September. Poland's allies Britain and France honoured their alliance and subsequently declared war on Germany. In 1941, acting once again in accordance with the policy of lebensraum, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, using the casus belli of pre-emptive war to justify the act of aggression. The Soviet Union also employed a manufactured casus belli during World War II. In November 1939, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities between Germany, Britain and France, the Soviet Union staged the shelling of the Russian village of Mainila, which it blamed on the Finns. This manufactured incident was then used as a casus belli for the invasion of Finland. In 1998, Russian President Boris Yeltsin admitted that the invasion had in fact constituted a Soviet war of aggression. Six-Day War A casus belli played a prominent role during the Six-Day War of 1967. The Israeli government had a short list of casus belli, acts that it would consider provocations justifying armed retaliation. The most important was a blockade of the Straits of Tiran leading into Eilat, Israel's only port to the Red Sea, through which Israel received much of its oil. After several border incidents between Israel and Egypt's allies Syria and Jordan, Egypt expelled UNEF peacekeepers from the Sinai Peninsula, established a military presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, and announced a blockade of the straits, prompting Israel to cite its casus belli in opening hostilities against Egypt. Vietnam War Many historians have suggested that the Gulf of Tonkin Incident was a manufactured pretext for the Vietnam War. North Vietnamese Naval officials have publicly stated that the USS Maddox was never fired on by North Vietnamese naval forces. The movie "The Fog of War" contains an admission from former US Defense Secretary at the time Robert McNamara that the Gulf of Tonkin Incident "never happened". Deniability played favorably into the propaganda efforts of North Vietnam throughout the war, and for some years to follow. However, the PAVN Museum in Hanoi found it irresistible to proudly display "Part of a torpedo boat... which successfully chased away the USS Maddox August, [sic] 2nd 1964". 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon The casus belli cited by Israel for its June 1982 invasion of Lebanon was the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador in London, which the Israeli government blamed on the Palestinian Liberation Organization (although the attempt had actually been made by the PNLM, a Palestinian splinter group implacably opposed to the PLO). In reality however, the invasion had long been planned by the Israelis, who were concerned about the growing power of the PLO in Lebanon. Turkey and Greece Main article: Aegean dispute In 1995, The Turkish Parliament issued a casus belli against Greece in reaction to an enacted extension of Greek territorial waters from 6 nautical miles (11 km) to 12 nautical miles (22 km) from the coast. War on Terror The casus belli for the Bush administration's conceptual War on Terror, which resulted in the 2001 Afghan war and the 2003 Iraq war, was the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City, The Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia and the apparently intended attack on the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. 2003 Invasion of Iraq When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, it cited non-compliance with the terms of cease-fire for the 1990-1991 Gulf War, as well as planning in 1997 the attempted assassinations of former President George Bush and then-sitting President Bill Clinton as its stated casus belli. Cited by the Bush administration was Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. The administration claimed that Iraq had not conformed with its obligation to disarm under past UN Resolutions, and that Saddam Hussein was actively attempting to acquire a nuclear weapons capability as well as enhance an existing arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed a plenary session of the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003 citing these reasons as justification for military action. Subsequent to the invasion, a US government-sponsored report concluded that although Saddam Hussein had intended to resume WMD production once the Gulf War sanctions were lifted, none of the alleged WMD stockpiles were found during or after the subsequent invasion.
Casus belli
Casus belli is a Latin expression meaning the justification for acts of war. Casus means "incident", "rupture" or indeed "case", while belli means "of war". It is usually distinguished from casus foederis, with casus belli being used to refer to offenses or threats directly against a nation, and casus foederis to refer to offenses or threats to another, allied, nation with which the justifying nation is engaged in a mutual defense treaty, such as NATO.
It is sometimes misspelled and mispronounced as "causus belli" since this resembles the English "cause" (and a different Latin word, causa {cause}). "Casus belli" is sometimes pronounced this way because the term is used with the meaning of "cause for war", instead of "case of war" (notice that "case" comes from Latin "casus"). The OED, however, gives the pronunciation above.
The term came into wide usage in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the writings of Hugo Grotius (1625), Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1737), and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1748), among others, and the rise of the political doctrine of jus ad bellum or "just war theory". Informal usage varies beyond its technical definition to refer to any "just cause" a nation may claim for entering into a conflict. As such, it has been used both retroactively to describe situations in history before the term came into wide usage and in the present day when describing situations when war has not been formally declared.
Formally, a government would lay out its reasons for going to war, as well as its intentions in prosecuting it and the steps that might be taken to avert it. In so doing, the government would attempt to demonstrate that it was going to war only as a last resort (ultima Ratio) and that it in fact possessed "just cause" for doing so. In theory international law today allows only three situations as legal cause to go to war: out of self-defense, defense of an ally under a mutual defense pact, or sanctioned by the UN. Any war for another cause is considered illegal and those who engage in it subject to prosecution for a war crime.
Proschema (plural proschemata) is the Greek equivalent term. The stated reasons may or may not be the actual reason for waging the war (prophasis, πρὸφασις). The term was first popularized by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War, who identified fear, honor, and interest as the three primary real reasons that wars are waged, while proschemata commonly play up nationalism or fearmongering (as opposed to rational or reasonable fears).
Reasons for use
Countries need a public justification for attacking another country. This justification is needed to galvanize internal support for the war, as well as gain the support of potential allies.
In the post World War Two era, the UN Charter prohibits signatory countries from engaging in war except 1) as a means of defending themselves against aggression, or 2) unless the UN as a body has given prior approval to the operation. The UN also reserves the right to ask member nations to intervene against non-signatory countries which embark on wars of aggression. In effect, this means that countries in the modern era must have a plausible casus belli for initiating military action, or risk UN sanctions or intervention.
It is sometimes misspelled and mispronounced as "causus belli" since this resembles the English "cause" (and a different Latin word, causa {cause}). "Casus belli" is sometimes pronounced this way because the term is used with the meaning of "cause for war", instead of "case of war" (notice that "case" comes from Latin "casus"). The OED, however, gives the pronunciation above.
The term came into wide usage in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with the writings of Hugo Grotius (1625), Cornelius van Bynkershoek (1737), and Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui (1748), among others, and the rise of the political doctrine of jus ad bellum or "just war theory". Informal usage varies beyond its technical definition to refer to any "just cause" a nation may claim for entering into a conflict. As such, it has been used both retroactively to describe situations in history before the term came into wide usage and in the present day when describing situations when war has not been formally declared.
Formally, a government would lay out its reasons for going to war, as well as its intentions in prosecuting it and the steps that might be taken to avert it. In so doing, the government would attempt to demonstrate that it was going to war only as a last resort (ultima Ratio) and that it in fact possessed "just cause" for doing so. In theory international law today allows only three situations as legal cause to go to war: out of self-defense, defense of an ally under a mutual defense pact, or sanctioned by the UN. Any war for another cause is considered illegal and those who engage in it subject to prosecution for a war crime.
Proschema (plural proschemata) is the Greek equivalent term. The stated reasons may or may not be the actual reason for waging the war (prophasis, πρὸφασις). The term was first popularized by Thucydides in his History of the Peloponnesian War, who identified fear, honor, and interest as the three primary real reasons that wars are waged, while proschemata commonly play up nationalism or fearmongering (as opposed to rational or reasonable fears).
Reasons for use
Countries need a public justification for attacking another country. This justification is needed to galvanize internal support for the war, as well as gain the support of potential allies.
In the post World War Two era, the UN Charter prohibits signatory countries from engaging in war except 1) as a means of defending themselves against aggression, or 2) unless the UN as a body has given prior approval to the operation. The UN also reserves the right to ask member nations to intervene against non-signatory countries which embark on wars of aggression. In effect, this means that countries in the modern era must have a plausible casus belli for initiating military action, or risk UN sanctions or intervention.
Security Information Agency
The Security Information Agency (Serbian: Безбедносно-информативна агенција / Bezbednosno-informativna agencija; БИА / BIA) is the intelligence agency of the Republic of Serbia that deals with bringing information (concerning organized crime, terrorism and many other areas) of security issue to Serbia, then analyzing and presenting it to state institutions for further action.
It was formed in 2002 and its headquarters is in Queen Anna Street in Belgrade, Serbia's capital. The predecessor of BIA was SDB, State Security Agency (Serbian: Служба државне безбедности / Služba državne bezbednosti), Serbia's intelligence agency up until 2002.
According to the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, BIA is under the control of the National Assembly of Serbia and the Government of Serbia. BIA has to brief these two institutions about the state of security of the Republic of Serbia twice a year.
Yugoslav People's Army Part IV
Dissolution
During the early stages of the Yugoslav wars, and in general during the breakup of Yugoslavia, there was a great sense of confusion and concern as to the role that would be played by the Yugoslav People's Army.
Due to the fact that roughly 60% of the JNA's upper leadership was ethnically Serbian, when war broke out in Croatia in 1991 (Croatian War of Independence), the Croatians increasingly treated the JNA as a hostile force. During the Battle of Vukovar, the diverse ethnic backgrounds of the JNA's soldiers with no real stake or interest in the war in Croatia led to instances of desertion and confusion in the area. This was primarily caused by a lack of understanding as to where they stood with both the Croatian defence forces and the Serbian paramilitary units who were promoting a purely Serbian agenda in Eastern Slavonia.
The morale in parts of the JNA became very low as the war intensified. On September 29, 1991, the navy admiral Vladimir Barović committed suicide while stationed at the Vis naval base, leaving a suicide letter which stated that he could not reconcile his feeling of honor as a Montenegrin with the aggression of the JNA against Croatia.[citation needed] At the beginning of the war in Croatia, the JNA targeted civilians, killing three children near the Grabovac Campground at Plitvice Lakes.
By the end of 1991, when both Slovenia and Croatia had practically seceded, the JNA was crippled as a joint army of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and was deprived of its basic fundamentals as a fighting force.
Further complications arose when the Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina declared their independence and an already unpopular war caused conscription levels in Serbia to drop to only 13% of what was required to maintain a functioning army. Many in Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina felt that the war was none of their concern and that their people should not have anything to do with the conflicts developing in the region. By mid-1992, war spread to Bosnia.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was replaced by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, JNA was subsequently dissolved and replaced by the Yugoslav Military (Vojska Jugoslavia) or VJ.
In May 1992, the United Nations Security Council confirmed independence of the new republics and accepted them into the UN. In accordance, the Yugoslav Army was asked to withdraw from Bosnia (as it was now deemed a hostile armed intervention in another sovereign state) or face sanctions. On May 12, 1992, JNA units were split between the Army of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Army of Republika Srpska (mostly in accordance with geographical location or place of origin), along with the majority of officer staff. In reality, this meant that many units changed nothing except their titles and insignia.
After the formation of militaries in the new republics and the JNA was officially dissolved, the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reformed with new democratic intentions overshadowing the old socialistic fundamentals of the Yugoslav People's Army. Changes to the Yugoslav Military (Vojska Jugoslavia) were very slow and modernization did not begin until near the war's end. The solidarity of the army cadres helped keep Slobodan Milošević in power, but when he was overthrown, the army did not intervene.
In the end, Serbia inherited most of Yugoslavia's military arsenal, though some of its infrastructure was destroyed or left behind in other Yugoslav republics. Croatians captured some of the arsenal in the Battle of the Barracks. What remained of the navy was left to Montenegro.
Yugoslav People's Army Part III
Navy
Minor surface combatants operated by the Yugoslav Navy included nearly eighty frigates, corvettes, submarines, minesweepers, and missile, torpedo, and patrol boats in the Adriatic Fleet. The entire coast of Yugoslavia was part of the naval region headquartered at Split (now part of Croatia).
The Partisans had operated many small boats in raids harassing Italian convoys in the Adriatic Sea during World War II. After the war, the navy operated numerous German and Italian submarines, destroyers, minesweepers, and tank-landing craft captured during the war or received as war reparations. The United States provided eight torpedo boats in the late 1940s, but most of those units were soon obsolete. The navy was upgraded in the 1960s when it acquired ten Osa-I class missile boats and four Shershen class torpedo boats from the Soviet Union. The Soviets granted a license to build eleven additional Shershen units in Yugoslav shipyards developed for this purpose.
In 1980 and 1982, the Yugoslav navy took delivery of two Soviet Koni class frigates. In 1988 it completed two additional units under license. The Koni frigates were armed with four Soviet P-15 Termit surface-to-surface missile launchers, twin 9K33 Osa (NATO reporting name: SA-8 "Gecko") surface-to-air missiles, and anti-submarine rocket launchers.
The Yugoslav navy developed its own submarine-building capability during the 1960s. In 1990, the main combat units of the submarine service were three Heroj class submarines armed with 533 mm torpedoes. Two smaller Sava class submarines entered service in the late 1970s. Two Sutjeska-class submarines had been relegated mainly to training missions by 1990. At that time the navy had apparently shifted to construction of versatile midget submarines. Four Una-class midgets and four Mala-class swimmer delivery vehicles were in service in the late 1980s. They were built for use by underwater demolition teams and special forces. The Una-class boats carried five crewmen, eight combat swimmers, four Mala vehicles, and limpet mines. The Mala vehicles carried two swimmers and 250 kilograms of mines.
The Yugoslav navy operated ten Osa class missile boats and six Končar class missile boats. The Osa I boats were armed with four P-15 Termit surface-to-surface missile launchers. In 1990, ten domestic Kobra missile boats were scheduled to begin replacing the Osa I class. The Kobra class was to be armed with eight Swedish RBS-15 anti-ship missiles, and fifteen of them were ordered in late 1989. Armed with two P-15 Termit launchers, the Končar class boats were modeled after the Spica class torpedo boats, and there were plans to upgrade them with Swedish-built missiles. Two Kobra missile boats were built by Croatia as the Kralj class fast attack craft and both are still in service. The navy's fifteen Topčider-class torpedo boats included four former Soviet Shershen-class and eleven Yugoslav built units.
The Yugoslav navy's mine warfare and countermeasures capabilities were considered adequate in 1990. It operated four Vukov Klanac-class coastal minesweepers built on a French design, four British Ham class minesweepers, and six 117-class inshore minesweepers built in domestic shipyards. Larger numbers of older and less capable minesweepers were mainly used in riverine operations. Other older units were used as dedicated minelayers. The navy used amphibious landing craft in support of army operations in the area of the Danube, Sava, and Drava rivers. They included both tank and assault landing craft. In 1990, there were four 501-class, ten 211-class, and twenty-five 601-class landing craft in service. Most of them were also capable of laying mines in rivers and coastal areas.
The Yugoslav Navy had 10,000 sailors (including 4,400 conscripts and 900 marines). This was essentially a coastal defense force with the mission of preventing enemy amphibious landings along the country's rugged 4,000-kilometer shoreline and coastal islands, and contesting an enemy blockade or control of the strategic Strait of Otranto. The entire coast of Yugoslavia was part of the naval region headquartered at Split. The naval region was divided into three smaller naval districts and a riverine flotilla with major naval bases located at Split, Sibenik, Pula, Ploce and Kotor on the Adriatic Sea, and Novi Sad on the River Danube. The strategic islands of Vis and Lastovo were heavily fortified and unauthorised entry was prohibited. The fleet was organized into missile, torpedo, and patrol boat brigades, a submarine division, and minesweeper flotillas. The naval order of battle included four frigates, three corvettes, five patrol submarines, fifty-eight missile, torpedo, and patrol boats, and twenty-eight minesweepers. One antisubmarine warfare helicopter squadron was based at Split on the Adriatic coast. It employed Soviet Ka-25, Ka-28, and Mi-8 helicopters, and domestic Partisan helicopters. Some air force fighter and reconnaissance squadrons supported naval operations.
Yugoslav People's Army Part II
Ground forces
The ground forces led in number of personnel. In 1991 there were about 165,000 active-duty soldiers (including 90,000 conscripts), and over a million trained reservists could be mobilized in wartime. Each of the Yugoslav constituent republics had its own Territorial Defence Forces which in wartime would be subordinate to Supreme Command as an integral part of the defence system. The Territorial Defence (Reserve Force) was made up of former conscripts; they were occasionally called up for war exercises.
The ground forces were organised into infantry, armour, artillery, and air defence, as well as signal, engineering and chemical defence corps.
Air Force
The Yugoslav Air Force had about 32,000 personnel including 4,000 conscripts, and operated over 1,000 aircraft and 200 helicopters. In 1991, it was the second largest air force in Europe. It was responsible for transport, reconnaissance, and rotary-wing aircraft as well as the national air defense system. The primary air force missions were to contest enemy efforts to establish air supremacy over Yugoslavia and to support the defensive operations of the ground forces and navy. Most aircraft were produced in Yugoslavia. Missiles were produced domestically or supplied by the Soviet Union.
The Yugoslav Air Force had twelve squadrons of domestically produced ground attack fighters. The ground attack squadrons provided close air support to ground force operations. They were equipped with 165 new Soko J-22 Orao, Super Galeb and J-21 Jastreb, and older Soko J-20 Kraguj fighters. Many ground attack fighters were armed with AGM-65 Maverick air-to-surface missiles purchased from the United States. Others were armed with Soviet Kh-23 and Kh-28 missiles. The air force also had about ninety armed Mi-8 helicopter gunships to provide added mobility and fire support for small ground units. A large number of reconnaissance aircraft were available to support ground forces operations. Four squadrons of seventy Galeb, Jastreb, and Orao-1 fighters were configured for reconnaissance missions.
The Yugoslav Air Force had nine squadrons of 130 Soviet-made MiG-21 interceptors for air defence. First produced in the late 1950s, the MiG-21 design was largely obsolete in 1990 and represented a potential weakness in Yugoslavia's air defense. However, the bulk of the MiG-21 fleet consisted mainly of the bis variant, the latest production MiG-21 model, and was armed with Soviet Vympel K-13 (NATO reporting name: AA-2 "Atoll"), air-to-air missiles and some more modern Molniya R-60 (NATO reporting name: AA-8 "Aphid") missiles as well as twin 23 mm cannons. By 1989, Yugoslavia started developing a new domestic multirole fighter called Novi Avion, which was supposed to replace the MiG-21 and J-21 Jastreb fleets entirely. The design of the new aircraft was influenced by both Mirage 2000 and Dassault Rafale fighter types and it was to enter service by early 2000s. As an interim solution, a modernization package was planned for the MiG-21 and it is speculated that India's MiG-21 Bison upgrade was actually intended for Yugoslav aircraft.
In 1987, Yugoslavia acquired 16 MiG-29 interceptors.
Although not officially known at the time, Yugoslavia was rumored to have been interested in the purchase of certain numbers of Su-25 attack-aircraft and Mi-24 gunships. Instead of developing its own fighter plane, the Novi Avion, the country made a request to licence-build the F-20, but due to unstable relations with the US, the request was rejected. By the late 1980s, the licenced production of Eurocopter Super Puma was also envisaged, but due to the dissolution of the country, it was never realized.
The Yugoslav Air Force conducted a large pilot training program with almost 200 G-2's, G-4's, and UTVA-75 aircraft. The propeller-driven UTVA trainers had under-wing pylons capable of carrying light weapon loads. A new UTVA Lasta trainer was under development in 1990. After practicing instrument and night flying, gunnery, bombing, rocket firing, and aerial maneuvers in the Lasta, student pilots progressed to the Super Galeb. Twenty Partisan helicopters were used for pilot training.
One of the most impressive structures operated by the JNA Air Force was the underground Željava Air Base near the town of Bihac in Bosnia. The structure was made to withstand a nuclear explosion and was destroyed by the JNA in 1992 to prevent its capture. Željava was home to the 117th Fighter Aviation Regiment, which was composed of the 124th and 125th Fighter Squadrons, equipped with MiG-21Bis fighters, and the 352nd Reconnaissance Squadron, equipped with MiG-21R aircraft.
The Air and Air Defence Forces were headquartered at Zemun and had fighter and bomber aircraft, helicopters, and air defence artillery units at air bases throughout the former Yugoslavia: Batajnica Air Base (Belgrade), Niš Constantine the Great Airport, Slatina Air Base (Priština), Golubovci Airbase (Titograd), Skopski Petrovec, Sarajevo, Mostar, Željava Air Base (Bihać), Pleso (Zagreb), Split Airport, Pula, Zemunik (Zadar), Cerklje ob Krki and many other smaller air bases.
Yugoslav People's Army Part I
The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA, YPA) (Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian: Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija or Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA, Cyrillic script: Југославенска народна армија or Југословенска народна армија – JHA; Slovene: Jugoslovanska ljudska armada – JLA) was the military of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Origins
The origins of the JNA can be found in the Yugoslav Partisan units of World War II. As part of the antifascist People's Liberation War of Yugoslavia, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia (NOVJ), a predecessor of the JNA, was formed in the town of Rudo in Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 22, 1941. After the liberation of the country from the Axis Powers, that date was officially celebrated as the Day of the Army in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yugoslavia).
In March 1945, the NOVJ was renamed the Yugoslav Army (Jugoslovenska Armija) and finally on its 10th anniversary on December 22, 1951, received the adjective "People's" (Narodna).
Organization
Once considered the third strongest army in Europe and fourth in the world (only the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union were stronger),[neutrality is disputed] the JNA consisted of the ground forces, air force and navy. It was organized into four military regions which were further divided into districts that were responsible for administrative tasks such as draft registration, mobilization, and construction and maintenance of military facilities. The regions were: Belgrade (responsible for eastern Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), Zagreb (Slovenia and northern Croatia), Skopje (Republic of Macedonia, southern Serbia and Montenegro) and Split Naval Region. Of the JNA's 180,000 soldiers, more than 90,000 were conscripts.
In 1990, the army had nearly completed a major overhaul of its basic force structure. It eliminated its old divisional infantry organization and established the brigade as the largest operational unit. The army converted ten of twelve infantry divisions into twenty-nine tank, mechanized and mountain infantry brigades with integral artillery, air defense and anti-tank regiments. One airborne brigade was organized before 1990. The shift to brigade-level organization provided greater operational flexibility, maneuverability, tactical initiative and reduced the possibility that large army units would be destroyed in set piece engagements with an aggressor. The change created many senior field command positions that would develop relatively young and talented officers. The brigade structure had advantages at a time of declining manpower.
Industry and Infrastructure
The arms industry was dominant in the Yugoslavian economy. With annual exports of $3 billion, it was twice as large as the second largest industry, tourism. It had modern infrastructure with underground air bases and control centres in several mountains. The biggest and best known installation was the Željava Air Base, also known as the Bihać Underground Integrated Radar Control and Surveillance Centre and Air Base, in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Several companies in Yugoslavia produced airplanes and specifically combat aircraft, most notably SOKO of Mostar, with the Soko J-22 Orao being its best known product. Another important manufacturer was Utva in Serbia. The Yugoslav military-industrial complex produced tanks (most notably, the M-84), armored vehicles (BOV APC, BVP M-80), various artillery pieces (mortars, multiple rocket launchers, howitzers), anti-aircraft weapons, as well as various types of infantry weapons and other equipment.
UDBA
Activities
From 1963 - 1974, security intelligence services dealt with a series of domestic and foreign political events. At home, there were political confrontation both before and after the Brioni Plenum (1966), liberal flareups and massive leftist Students' demonstrations in Belgrade in 1968, Hrvatsko proljeće (Croatian Spring) or "MASPOK" (mass movement) in Croatia in 1971, an incursion of a group of nationalists (Raduša, 1972), and a revival of nationalism in Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. The most significant event abroad was the invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968.
These were the circumstances at the time the first act on internal affairs of the individual republics was adopted in 1967. According to this act, internal affairs were handled directly by the municipal administrative bodies and the secretariats of internal affairs of each republic or by their provincial bodies. This was the first time since 1945 that republics gained control and greater influence over their individual security organs and intelligence security services.
The State Security Service (SDB) was defined by law as a professional service within the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs (RSUP). Naturally, most of its competence remained within federal institutions, as prescribed by the Act on Handling Internal Affairs Under Competence of Federal Administrative Bodies (1971), which determined that the federal secretariat of internal affairs coordinate the work of the SDB in the republics and provinces. Further steps were taken with the transformation of state administration, adoption of the Federal Act on State Administration (1978), and the Republic Act (1978). The newly adopted act on internal affairs tasked the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs (RSUP) with state security issues, which then became RSUP issues and were no longer given special handling "at the RSUP". This resolution remained in force until the 1991 modifications of the act on internal affairs.
The UDBA Since 1986
The role of intelligence and security changed after 1986, when a different mentality reigned within the Party and the processes of democratization were initiated. Intelligence security agencies came under attack, and many people started publicly writing about and criticizing the SDB. There were no more taboo subjects. The party organization was abolished in the SDB and the first attempts to introduce parliamentary control began.
The appointment of a commission to monitor the work was one of the most absurd decisions made by the country's intelligence security services during the era of "social democracy", since SDB activity was regulated by federal legislation and regulations published in the secret Official Gazettes. Neither the commission members nor its president had access to these Acts. It was difficult to evaluate information, since the commission had no investigative powers or capability to verify information. The head of the service was tasked simply to deliver requested information, even classified, to the commission. The SDB was also still receiving tasks from the Party, although the supervising commission lacked the powers to control those tasks. The above-mentioned events undermined the unity of the SDB, which formulated its own, unpublished regulations (sub-legal acts, ordinances, etc.). This made any protest about violation of rights impossible, as the regulations were inaccessible to the public.
The first democratic multi party elections in 1990, which enhanced the process of democratization, reverberated within the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs (SSUP) and Federal State Security Service (SSDB), which were fighting to maintain control over the individual SDBs in the republics. The latter became increasingly disunited; it was still legally connected to the federal bodies, but was becoming aware of the fact that it operated and worked in their particular republic. Some professional cadres, especially those in the "domestic field" (dealing with the "bourgeois right wing", clericalists, and student movements), began leaving the service. Conflict was increasing, and SDB archives were being systematically destroyed. In its search for new roles, the SDBs also began to limit information they were sending to the SSDB. It ultimately restricted its information to foreign intelligence services.
Along with the weakening positions of the SSDB position was becoming weaker and attempts by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Security Service or KOS to strengthen its position in the republics and in the individual SDBs were becoming more numerous. The attempts failed because they depended upon cadres of other nationalities still employed at the SDBs but who had no access to data bases and had no decision-making power due to their "Yugoslav" orientation.
From 1963 - 1974, security intelligence services dealt with a series of domestic and foreign political events. At home, there were political confrontation both before and after the Brioni Plenum (1966), liberal flareups and massive leftist Students' demonstrations in Belgrade in 1968, Hrvatsko proljeće (Croatian Spring) or "MASPOK" (mass movement) in Croatia in 1971, an incursion of a group of nationalists (Raduša, 1972), and a revival of nationalism in Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia, and Slovenia. The most significant event abroad was the invasion of the Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia in 1968.
These were the circumstances at the time the first act on internal affairs of the individual republics was adopted in 1967. According to this act, internal affairs were handled directly by the municipal administrative bodies and the secretariats of internal affairs of each republic or by their provincial bodies. This was the first time since 1945 that republics gained control and greater influence over their individual security organs and intelligence security services.
The State Security Service (SDB) was defined by law as a professional service within the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs (RSUP). Naturally, most of its competence remained within federal institutions, as prescribed by the Act on Handling Internal Affairs Under Competence of Federal Administrative Bodies (1971), which determined that the federal secretariat of internal affairs coordinate the work of the SDB in the republics and provinces. Further steps were taken with the transformation of state administration, adoption of the Federal Act on State Administration (1978), and the Republic Act (1978). The newly adopted act on internal affairs tasked the Republic Secretariat of Internal Affairs (RSUP) with state security issues, which then became RSUP issues and were no longer given special handling "at the RSUP". This resolution remained in force until the 1991 modifications of the act on internal affairs.
The UDBA Since 1986
The role of intelligence and security changed after 1986, when a different mentality reigned within the Party and the processes of democratization were initiated. Intelligence security agencies came under attack, and many people started publicly writing about and criticizing the SDB. There were no more taboo subjects. The party organization was abolished in the SDB and the first attempts to introduce parliamentary control began.
The appointment of a commission to monitor the work was one of the most absurd decisions made by the country's intelligence security services during the era of "social democracy", since SDB activity was regulated by federal legislation and regulations published in the secret Official Gazettes. Neither the commission members nor its president had access to these Acts. It was difficult to evaluate information, since the commission had no investigative powers or capability to verify information. The head of the service was tasked simply to deliver requested information, even classified, to the commission. The SDB was also still receiving tasks from the Party, although the supervising commission lacked the powers to control those tasks. The above-mentioned events undermined the unity of the SDB, which formulated its own, unpublished regulations (sub-legal acts, ordinances, etc.). This made any protest about violation of rights impossible, as the regulations were inaccessible to the public.
The first democratic multi party elections in 1990, which enhanced the process of democratization, reverberated within the Federal Secretariat of Internal Affairs (SSUP) and Federal State Security Service (SSDB), which were fighting to maintain control over the individual SDBs in the republics. The latter became increasingly disunited; it was still legally connected to the federal bodies, but was becoming aware of the fact that it operated and worked in their particular republic. Some professional cadres, especially those in the "domestic field" (dealing with the "bourgeois right wing", clericalists, and student movements), began leaving the service. Conflict was increasing, and SDB archives were being systematically destroyed. In its search for new roles, the SDBs also began to limit information they were sending to the SSDB. It ultimately restricted its information to foreign intelligence services.
Along with the weakening positions of the SSDB position was becoming weaker and attempts by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Security Service or KOS to strengthen its position in the republics and in the individual SDBs were becoming more numerous. The attempts failed because they depended upon cadres of other nationalities still employed at the SDBs but who had no access to data bases and had no decision-making power due to their "Yugoslav" orientation.
UDBA
Uprava državne bezbednosti/sigurnosti/varnosti or UDBA (Serbian Cyrillic: Управа државне безбедности, УДБА; Macedonian Cyrillic: Управа за државна безбедност, УДБА; literally: State Security Administration) was the secret police organization of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is alleged that the UDBA was responsible for the eliminations of dozens of enemies of the state within Yugoslavia and internationally (estimates about 200 eliminations and kidnappings). Eliminations vary from those of notorious war criminals (e.g. Vjekoslav "Maks" Luburić and Ante Pavelić) in Spain and Argentina to those of the Croatian emigrant and secessionist Bruno Bušić on October 16, 1978 in Paris.
Functions
The UDBA formed a major part of the Yugoslav intelligence services during 1946-1991 period, primarily responsible for internal state-security. After 1946 the State Security Administration (UDB) underwent numerous security and intelligence changes due to topical issues at that time, including: fighting gangs; protection of the economy; Cominform/Informbiro; and bureaucratic aspirations. In 1945 and 1946, for instance, the UDB was organized into districts. In 1950, when the administrative-territorial units were abolished as authorities, the UDB was reorganized again. During this period the intelligence and security activities concentrated less on intelligence and more on internal security. There was an emphasis on collectivism, brotherhood, social harmony, loyalty, and tolerance towards those with different views. Deviation from this set of values became an immediate issue for security services.
Later, the use of force was mitigated and when the process of "decentralization of people's power" began, intelligence and security services underwent further reorganization in order to deconcentrate power and increase effectiveness. The Act on Internal Affairs and the Decree on Organization of State Internal Affairs Secretariat regulated the intelligence security authority as the prerogative of the State Security Directorate within the Ministry of the Interior. The following reorganization addressed issues relating to the competence of the federation (state security, cross-border traffic, foreign citizens, passports, introduction and dissemination of foreign press, and federal citizenship).
Structure
Intelligence and security activity was organized in the following manner:
After OZNA (Одељење заштите народа / Odeljenje zaštite naroda) was abolished, intelligence activity was divided among various federal ministries: the Federal Ministry of the Interior by the State Security Administration; and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Service of Investigation and Documentation (SID), which collected foreign political information; military-defense intelligence was handled by the GS 2nd Department- KOS (Kontraobavještajna služba/ Counterintelligence Service) of Yugoslav People's Army.
SDB in the republics was not autonomous, but was tied to the federal service which co-ordinated the work and issued instructions.
State security was regulated by secret legislation (secret Official Gazette), which prescribed the use of special operations. The SDB performed house searches, covert interceptions inside the premises, telecommunications interception, covert surveillance of people, and covert interception of letters and other consignments.
Of primary interest to the SDB was the domestic - identifying and obstructing activities of the "domestic enemy" (i.e. the "bourgeois rightwing", clericalists, members of the Cominform, nationalists, and separatists). Intelligence work abroad was deemed less important and was under federal control.
The SDB was a "political police", answerable to the party organization from which it received its guidelines and to which it reported. The SDB was so deeply rooted in the political system that one of its tasks was the preparation of "Political Security Assessments"; that is, assessments on literally all spheres of life.
During its activity, the SDB enjoyed a wide range of power, including classical police powers (identifications, interrogations, and arrests).
The SDB organization was constantly changing and making improvements, but it remained tied to the central unit in republic capitals and smaller working groups in the field. All information and data flowed into the central unit in the capitals and sent on from there to the users. Field groups had working contacts with the local authorities, but did not answer to them.
Functions
The UDBA formed a major part of the Yugoslav intelligence services during 1946-1991 period, primarily responsible for internal state-security. After 1946 the State Security Administration (UDB) underwent numerous security and intelligence changes due to topical issues at that time, including: fighting gangs; protection of the economy; Cominform/Informbiro; and bureaucratic aspirations. In 1945 and 1946, for instance, the UDB was organized into districts. In 1950, when the administrative-territorial units were abolished as authorities, the UDB was reorganized again. During this period the intelligence and security activities concentrated less on intelligence and more on internal security. There was an emphasis on collectivism, brotherhood, social harmony, loyalty, and tolerance towards those with different views. Deviation from this set of values became an immediate issue for security services.
Later, the use of force was mitigated and when the process of "decentralization of people's power" began, intelligence and security services underwent further reorganization in order to deconcentrate power and increase effectiveness. The Act on Internal Affairs and the Decree on Organization of State Internal Affairs Secretariat regulated the intelligence security authority as the prerogative of the State Security Directorate within the Ministry of the Interior. The following reorganization addressed issues relating to the competence of the federation (state security, cross-border traffic, foreign citizens, passports, introduction and dissemination of foreign press, and federal citizenship).
Structure
Intelligence and security activity was organized in the following manner:
After OZNA (Одељење заштите народа / Odeljenje zaštite naroda) was abolished, intelligence activity was divided among various federal ministries: the Federal Ministry of the Interior by the State Security Administration; and the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the Service of Investigation and Documentation (SID), which collected foreign political information; military-defense intelligence was handled by the GS 2nd Department- KOS (Kontraobavještajna služba/ Counterintelligence Service) of Yugoslav People's Army.
SDB in the republics was not autonomous, but was tied to the federal service which co-ordinated the work and issued instructions.
State security was regulated by secret legislation (secret Official Gazette), which prescribed the use of special operations. The SDB performed house searches, covert interceptions inside the premises, telecommunications interception, covert surveillance of people, and covert interception of letters and other consignments.
Of primary interest to the SDB was the domestic - identifying and obstructing activities of the "domestic enemy" (i.e. the "bourgeois rightwing", clericalists, members of the Cominform, nationalists, and separatists). Intelligence work abroad was deemed less important and was under federal control.
The SDB was a "political police", answerable to the party organization from which it received its guidelines and to which it reported. The SDB was so deeply rooted in the political system that one of its tasks was the preparation of "Political Security Assessments"; that is, assessments on literally all spheres of life.
During its activity, the SDB enjoyed a wide range of power, including classical police powers (identifications, interrogations, and arrests).
The SDB organization was constantly changing and making improvements, but it remained tied to the central unit in republic capitals and smaller working groups in the field. All information and data flowed into the central unit in the capitals and sent on from there to the users. Field groups had working contacts with the local authorities, but did not answer to them.
OMON
In Chechnya
The force was active in the First Chechen War where the unit was used as light infantry and in the notorious "mopping-up" operations (zachistka). In February 1996, a group of 37 officers of the Novosibirsk OMON were captured by the Chechen militants during the Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye hostage crisis; 17 of them were later swapped for the Chechen fighters captured in the same incident. In August 1996, group of 30 Chechen OMON members answering to Said-Magomed Kakiyev were reportedly captured and executed in Grozny, the Chechen capital, during the battle for the city.
OMON is active in the Second Chechen War. Almost every Russian city sends, on a regular basis, small units of police (often composed of OMON members) for tours of duty in Chechnya lasting several months, while the Chechen Republic also formed its own OMON detachment. The force sustained heavy losses in the second conflict as well, including from the March 2000 ambush which killed more than 30 OMON servicemen from Perm (including nine captured and executed), the July 2000 suicide bombing which inflicted more than 100 casualties at the Chelyabinsk OMON base in Argun, and the April 2002 attack which killed 21 Chechen OMON troops in central Grozny.
Control and discipline is questionable in Chechnya, where the members of the group were noted to engage in or fall victim of several deadly friendly fire and fratricide incidents. In the bloodiest incident, at least 24 Russian OMON officers were killed and more than 30 wounded when two units (from Podolsk and Sergiyev Posad) fired on each other in Grozny on March 2, 2000. Among other incidents, several Chechen OMON servicemen were abducted and executed in Grozny by the Russian military servicemen in November 2000, members of the Chechen OMON clashed with the Ingush police on the Chechen-Ingush border resulting in eight fatalities and about 20 injuries in September 2006, and the Ramzan Kadyrov-controlled Chechen OMON clashed with a group of rival Chechens belonging to the Kakiyev's GRU commando unit in Grozny, resulting in five dead and several wounded in 2007.
In the course of the Chechen conflict the OMON was accused of severe human rights abuses, including abducting, torturing and killing civilians. As of 2000, the bulk of war crimes recorded by international organisations in Chechnya appeared to have been committed by the OMON. An OMON detachment from Moscow region took part in the April 1995 rampage in the village of Samashki, during which up to 300 civilians were reportedly killed in the result of a "cleansing operation" conducted there by the MVD forces. The OMON unit from Saint Petersburg is also believed to be behind the Novye Aldi massacre in which at least 60 civilians were robbed and then killed by the Russian forces entering Grozny in February 2000; one officer, Sergei Babin, was reported to be prosecuted in relation to the case in 2005 and then to disappear. In 1999 a group of unidentified OMON members shot dead around 40 refugees fleeing Grozny.
In April 2006, the European Court of Human Rights found Russia guilty of the forced disappearance of Shakhid Baysayev, a Chechen man who had gone missing after being detained in a March 2000 security sweep by the Russian OMON in Grozny. In 2007, the Khanty-Mansi OMON officer Sergei Lapin was sentenced for kidnapping and torture of a Chechen man in Grozny in 2001, with the Grozny court criticising the conduct of the OMON serving in Chechnya in broader terms. In an event related to the conflict in Chechnya, several OMON officers were accused of starting the May 2007 wave of the ethnic violence in Stavropol by assisting in the racist murder of a local Chechen man.
Before and early during the First and Second Chechen Wars, there were also OMON formations belonging the Interior Ministry of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Chechnya's separatist government.
OMON in Russia
Information from different sources suggests that there were between 10,500 and 15,000 OMON members stationed at population centers and transportation hubs around the country in the 1990s, yet by 2007 this number officially rose to about 20,000 nationwide (as referenced to as Innner Armed Forces). Members receive a comparatively small salary of about $700 per month in Moscow (regional units offer less). Most members retire at the age of approximately 45 years, and receive practically no financial aid from the state afterwards. They are also sometimes not paid for their service (in 2001, for example, some 50 OMON members from Moscow filed the lawsuit claiming they were not paid for one month of combat operations in Chechnya[32]). Due to the use of OMON members in high risk situations, especially in Chechnya and elsewhere in North Caucasus, the group often loses members in combat.
Members of OMON are supposed to be extremely fit and experts in small arms and hand-to-hand combat. Males between the ages of 22 and 30 who have completed their two-year military service can apply to join OMON (the application includes medical and psychological tests, and tests of speed and fitness). The initial training lasts for four months. The applicants are extensively trained in the use of different weaponry and close combat, and are also trained to follow orders at any cost. Special emphasis is put on urban combat and the entering and clearing of buildings. The training also includes legal training. The application procedure closes with a final test, where the applicant has to fight three to five trained members of OMON by hand wearing boxing gloves. Fewer than one in five applicants pass and are selected to join.
The OMON groups use a wide range of weapons, including but not limited to AK-74 assault rifle, AKS-74U carbine assault rifle, 9A-91 compact assault rifle, and PP-19 Bizon submachine gun. OMON units during a combat operations may also use other weaponry typical for the Russian light infantry (the OMON troops in Chechnya were sometimes called "OMON soldiers" in the reports,[33] especially in the so-called active phases of the conflict), such as the PK machine gun, the GP-25 underbarrel grenade launcher for AK-74 or the GM-94 pump-action grenade launcher, and the Dragunov and Vintorez sniper rifles.
OMON vehicles include specially-equipped vans, buses and trucks of various types, as well as limited number of armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60, BTR-70 and BTR-80). OMON's headgear remains a black beret (they are thus sometimes called "Black Berets") although otherwise there were significant changes in uniform and insignia. The group members often use the blue urban camouflage uniforms and black face masks while on duty, and various Russian Army and Internal Troops uniforms while in Chechnya. OMON of the Chechen Republic also frequently wear American-made military uniforms similar to these often used by the separatist fighters.
The force was active in the First Chechen War where the unit was used as light infantry and in the notorious "mopping-up" operations (zachistka). In February 1996, a group of 37 officers of the Novosibirsk OMON were captured by the Chechen militants during the Kizlyar-Pervomayskoye hostage crisis; 17 of them were later swapped for the Chechen fighters captured in the same incident. In August 1996, group of 30 Chechen OMON members answering to Said-Magomed Kakiyev were reportedly captured and executed in Grozny, the Chechen capital, during the battle for the city.
OMON is active in the Second Chechen War. Almost every Russian city sends, on a regular basis, small units of police (often composed of OMON members) for tours of duty in Chechnya lasting several months, while the Chechen Republic also formed its own OMON detachment. The force sustained heavy losses in the second conflict as well, including from the March 2000 ambush which killed more than 30 OMON servicemen from Perm (including nine captured and executed), the July 2000 suicide bombing which inflicted more than 100 casualties at the Chelyabinsk OMON base in Argun, and the April 2002 attack which killed 21 Chechen OMON troops in central Grozny.
Control and discipline is questionable in Chechnya, where the members of the group were noted to engage in or fall victim of several deadly friendly fire and fratricide incidents. In the bloodiest incident, at least 24 Russian OMON officers were killed and more than 30 wounded when two units (from Podolsk and Sergiyev Posad) fired on each other in Grozny on March 2, 2000. Among other incidents, several Chechen OMON servicemen were abducted and executed in Grozny by the Russian military servicemen in November 2000, members of the Chechen OMON clashed with the Ingush police on the Chechen-Ingush border resulting in eight fatalities and about 20 injuries in September 2006, and the Ramzan Kadyrov-controlled Chechen OMON clashed with a group of rival Chechens belonging to the Kakiyev's GRU commando unit in Grozny, resulting in five dead and several wounded in 2007.
In the course of the Chechen conflict the OMON was accused of severe human rights abuses, including abducting, torturing and killing civilians. As of 2000, the bulk of war crimes recorded by international organisations in Chechnya appeared to have been committed by the OMON. An OMON detachment from Moscow region took part in the April 1995 rampage in the village of Samashki, during which up to 300 civilians were reportedly killed in the result of a "cleansing operation" conducted there by the MVD forces. The OMON unit from Saint Petersburg is also believed to be behind the Novye Aldi massacre in which at least 60 civilians were robbed and then killed by the Russian forces entering Grozny in February 2000; one officer, Sergei Babin, was reported to be prosecuted in relation to the case in 2005 and then to disappear. In 1999 a group of unidentified OMON members shot dead around 40 refugees fleeing Grozny.
In April 2006, the European Court of Human Rights found Russia guilty of the forced disappearance of Shakhid Baysayev, a Chechen man who had gone missing after being detained in a March 2000 security sweep by the Russian OMON in Grozny. In 2007, the Khanty-Mansi OMON officer Sergei Lapin was sentenced for kidnapping and torture of a Chechen man in Grozny in 2001, with the Grozny court criticising the conduct of the OMON serving in Chechnya in broader terms. In an event related to the conflict in Chechnya, several OMON officers were accused of starting the May 2007 wave of the ethnic violence in Stavropol by assisting in the racist murder of a local Chechen man.
Before and early during the First and Second Chechen Wars, there were also OMON formations belonging the Interior Ministry of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, Chechnya's separatist government.
OMON in Russia
Information from different sources suggests that there were between 10,500 and 15,000 OMON members stationed at population centers and transportation hubs around the country in the 1990s, yet by 2007 this number officially rose to about 20,000 nationwide (as referenced to as Innner Armed Forces). Members receive a comparatively small salary of about $700 per month in Moscow (regional units offer less). Most members retire at the age of approximately 45 years, and receive practically no financial aid from the state afterwards. They are also sometimes not paid for their service (in 2001, for example, some 50 OMON members from Moscow filed the lawsuit claiming they were not paid for one month of combat operations in Chechnya[32]). Due to the use of OMON members in high risk situations, especially in Chechnya and elsewhere in North Caucasus, the group often loses members in combat.
Members of OMON are supposed to be extremely fit and experts in small arms and hand-to-hand combat. Males between the ages of 22 and 30 who have completed their two-year military service can apply to join OMON (the application includes medical and psychological tests, and tests of speed and fitness). The initial training lasts for four months. The applicants are extensively trained in the use of different weaponry and close combat, and are also trained to follow orders at any cost. Special emphasis is put on urban combat and the entering and clearing of buildings. The training also includes legal training. The application procedure closes with a final test, where the applicant has to fight three to five trained members of OMON by hand wearing boxing gloves. Fewer than one in five applicants pass and are selected to join.
The OMON groups use a wide range of weapons, including but not limited to AK-74 assault rifle, AKS-74U carbine assault rifle, 9A-91 compact assault rifle, and PP-19 Bizon submachine gun. OMON units during a combat operations may also use other weaponry typical for the Russian light infantry (the OMON troops in Chechnya were sometimes called "OMON soldiers" in the reports,[33] especially in the so-called active phases of the conflict), such as the PK machine gun, the GP-25 underbarrel grenade launcher for AK-74 or the GM-94 pump-action grenade launcher, and the Dragunov and Vintorez sniper rifles.
OMON vehicles include specially-equipped vans, buses and trucks of various types, as well as limited number of armoured personnel carriers (BTR-60, BTR-70 and BTR-80). OMON's headgear remains a black beret (they are thus sometimes called "Black Berets") although otherwise there were significant changes in uniform and insignia. The group members often use the blue urban camouflage uniforms and black face masks while on duty, and various Russian Army and Internal Troops uniforms while in Chechnya. OMON of the Chechen Republic also frequently wear American-made military uniforms similar to these often used by the separatist fighters.
OMON
OMON (Russian: Отряд милиции особого назначения; Otryad Militsii Osobogo Naznacheniya, Special Purpose Police Unit) (ОМОН) is a generic name for the system of special units of militsiya (police) within the Russian and earlier the Soviet MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs). As of 2008, there is an OMON unit in every oblast of Russia, as well as in many major cities; for example, there is an OMON unit within the Moscow City police department, and a separate unit within Moscow Oblast police department. Their motto is "We know no mercy and do not ask for any." OMON also continues to exist in Belarus and some other post-Soviet territories following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
History
OMON originated in 1979, when the first group was founded in preparation for the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow, to ensure that there were no terrorist attacks like the Munich massacre during the 1972 Summer Olympics. Subsequently, the unit was utilized in emergencies such as high-risk arrests, hostage crises, as well as in response to acts of terrorism. The OMON detachments were often manned by former soldiers of the Soviet Army and veterans of the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
The OMON system itself is the successor of that group and was founded in 1987, with the commando duties largely taken over by the SOBR (dangerous criminals) and Vityaz (counter-terrorism) units of the MVD. The OMON units were initially used as the riot police used to control and stop demonstrations and hooliganism, as well as other emergency situations, but later became accustomed to a wider range of police operations, including cordon and street patrol actions, and even paramilitary and military-style operations.
High-profile operations
On January 20, 1991, the Soviet Riga OMON attacked Latvia's Interior Ministry, killing six people during the January 1991 events following the republic's declaration of independence. Seven OMON members were subsequently found guilty by the Riga District Court and received suspended sentences.
A series of attacks on border outposts of the newly-independent Republic of Lithuania during the January-July 1991, resulting in several summary execution-style deaths of the unarmed customs officers and other people (including former members of Vilnius OMON), were attributed to Riga OMON; some sources say that the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had lost control of the unit. Lithuanian government continues to demand that the persons suspected in these incidents should be tried in Lithuania; one suspect was arrested in Latvia in November 2008.
Violent and often armed clashes between the Georgian SSR's OMON and the opponents of the first Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia prior to the Georgian Civil War of 1991-1993.
The April-May 1991 Operation Ring by the Azerbaijan SSR OMON and the Soviet Army against the Armenian irregular units in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, resulting in several dozen people killed and the forced displacement of thousands of ethnic Armenians.
Prior to the creation of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the bulk of the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh on the Azeri side was conducted by the post-Soviet OMON units and irregular forces. This included the defence of the village of Khojaly by the force of Azeri OMON and volunteers against the Armenian insurgents and the Russian Army forces prior and during the Khojaly massacre on February 25, 1992; most of the group involved died during the ensuing slaughter in which several hundred of Azeri civilians died.
The Moscow OMON and units brought from the other cities clashed with the anti-Yeltsin demonstrators order during the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis, reportedly even beating up some members of the Supreme Soviet of Russia (the Russian parliament at the time).
Cordon duties during the Russia's mass hostage crises, including the 1995 Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis, the 2002 Moscow theater hostage crisis and the 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis.
Breaking up of several opposition rallies (including Dissenters' Marches since 2006), sparking reports of police brutality, including excessive use of force and arbitrary detention of participants. In November 2007, the brutal actions of OMON against peaceful demonstrators and arrests of opposition figures were harshly criticised by the European Union institutions and governments.
On March 24, 2006, Belarusian OMON stormed the democratic opposition's tent camp at the Minsk October Square without provocation, violently ending the peaceful Jeans Revolution against the regime of Alexander Lukashenko. Thousands of people were beaten and hundreds detained as the result of the attack, including the opposition's presidential candidate Alaksandr Kazulin.
In June 2007, the Moscow OMON prevented the gay rights activists (including the European Parliament members) from demonstrating the parade by detaining the activists. This is because they were instructed to do so, as the mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov did not allow the parade to take place.
In August 2008, the South Ossetian separatist OMON took part in the fighting with the Georgian national forces during the 2008 South Ossetia war and were accused of "special cruelty" in the ethnic Georgian villages. Subsequently, South Ossetian OMON fighters were included into Russian regular forces in area as a contract soldiers and continued to be deployed in the highly-disputed Akhalgori zone.
ZOMO
Personnel and equipment
Since the mid-1970s ZOMO was reputed to be one of the best trained and equipped police formation in the Eastern Bloc. A candidate for ZOMO had to have the height of at least 180 cm and the weight of at least 90 kg. After the 1968 expansion, people conscripted to the military could optionally serve their draft in ZOMO (during the martial law, the military reservists who had served in ZOMO were called-up to the squads of ORMO, a reserve formation of MO). The formation numbered more than 12,000 members in the late 1980s (twice the original designation of 6,600), quartered in barracks in the major cities across the country. The martial-law-era ZOMO members were equipped with various police and military vehicles (including BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers in the Special Platoons) and various firearms (including shotguns, submachine guns and automatic rifles) as well as various types of riot equipment (such as batons, tear gas grenades, water cannon trucks, rubber bullets, metal and plastic riot shields and visored helmets). Since 1968 they wore military uniforms with a very similar camouflage pattern to the one used by the Polish People's Army.
Legacy
The ZOMO's last action took place on July 3, 1989, when they dispersed a demonstration against the presidential candidature of General Wojciech Jaruzelski (former leader of the Military Council of National Salvation). The units were disbanded on September 7, 1989, following the fall of the communist system, and replaced with the OPP (riot control) and SPAP (rapid response and counter-terrorism) units of Policja (the Polish police).
Since the mid-1970s ZOMO was reputed to be one of the best trained and equipped police formation in the Eastern Bloc. A candidate for ZOMO had to have the height of at least 180 cm and the weight of at least 90 kg. After the 1968 expansion, people conscripted to the military could optionally serve their draft in ZOMO (during the martial law, the military reservists who had served in ZOMO were called-up to the squads of ORMO, a reserve formation of MO). The formation numbered more than 12,000 members in the late 1980s (twice the original designation of 6,600), quartered in barracks in the major cities across the country. The martial-law-era ZOMO members were equipped with various police and military vehicles (including BTR-60 armoured personnel carriers in the Special Platoons) and various firearms (including shotguns, submachine guns and automatic rifles) as well as various types of riot equipment (such as batons, tear gas grenades, water cannon trucks, rubber bullets, metal and plastic riot shields and visored helmets). Since 1968 they wore military uniforms with a very similar camouflage pattern to the one used by the Polish People's Army.
Legacy
The ZOMO's last action took place on July 3, 1989, when they dispersed a demonstration against the presidential candidature of General Wojciech Jaruzelski (former leader of the Military Council of National Salvation). The units were disbanded on September 7, 1989, following the fall of the communist system, and replaced with the OPP (riot control) and SPAP (rapid response and counter-terrorism) units of Policja (the Polish police).
ZOMO
Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej (ZOMO) (Motorized Reserves of the Citizens' Militia), were paramilitary-police formations during the Communist Era, in the People's Republic of Poland. These, initially elite, units of Milicja Obywatelska (MO, Poland's militsiya) were created to fight dangerous criminals, provide security during mass events, and help in the case of natural disasters and other crises. Nevertheless, they became most notably known for an infamy gained in their brutal and sometimes lethal actions of quelling civil rights protests and riot control.
Early history
ZOMO units were created on December 24, 1956 under the direct command of the President of the Council of Ministers of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR, Poland's Communist party) and first used in 1957. Their mission statement was defined as "the protection of the nation," and their main role was as a rapid-response police force, structured after and trained by the instructors from the Schutzpolizei of East Germany. Since 1972, the duties of ZOMO included counter-terrorism (including countering aircraft hijackings), with the elite Special Platoons of the ZOMO (pl. Plutony Specjalne ZOMO) created in 1978. As opposition to the communist government in Poland grew, the units were expanded to counter the growing unrest, and their role became more of anti-riot police. In 1968, ZOMO was used to disperse the student protests during the 1968 Polish political crisis, leading to the reform of the formation. Two years later in 1970, thousands of troops from the Polish People's Army and ZOMO were used to quell the Polish 1970 protests, killing dozens of people and injuring more than 1,000.
Martial law
The ZOMO gained the most of their infamy during the period of martial law in Poland (1981–1983). During this time period their brutal actions against peaceful protesters often affiliated with the oppositionist Solidarity movement, and the subsequent lack of prosecution of those responsible for deaths of protesters, were major factors in bringing down the communist regime. To parody the communist newspeak during that time they were often sarcastically called "The beating heart of the Party" (pl. Bijące serce Partii). Since 1990 several trials against former ZOMO members and their political leaders took place, most prominently in the case of the massacre in the Wujek Coal Mine (where nine people where killed and 21 wounded when Katowice's Special Platoon opened fire on the striking miners in 1981 in the bloodiest incident of the martial law era).
Milicja Obywatelska
Milicja Obywatelska (Citizens' Militia or Civic Militia) was a state police institution in the People's Republic of Poland. It was created in 1944 by Soviet-sponsored PKWN, effectively replacing the pre-war police force. In 1990 it was transformed back into Policja.
The term milicja had been adapted from the cognate term, "militsiya," used in several communist countries. The term is derived from Militia, which in turn claims its etymology from the concept of a military force composed of ordinary citizens. Contrary to implied meaning, in most cases it represented rather a state-controlled force, used to exert political repression on the citizens.
Służba Bezpieczeństwa
Służba Bezpieczeństwa Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych (Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), or just SB, was the internal intelligence agency and secret police established in the People's Republic of Poland in 1956. It was the main organ in PRL responsible for political repression.
SB replaced the earlier Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (UB, Security Office (UBP, Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, official name {Public Security Office})) which was the regional branches name of the Ministry of Public Security of Poland (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego). Until 1990, the name Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (UBP) has remained the common form of plural ubecy /oo-beh-tsi/ singular ubek /oo-beh-ck/ referring to the SB, and its agents were referred to as esbecy /es-beh-tsi/ plural, singular esbek /es-beh-ck/).
It was replaced by the Urząd Ochrony Państwa in 1990 after the fall of communism.
History
Służba Bezpieczeństwa (lit. "Security Service", functioning as Secret Police) was established in November 1956 after the dissolution of the Komitet do spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (Committee for Public Security), which was responsible for the political police, counter-intelligence, intelligence, personal protection and confidential communications. It was the well-known successor of Ministry of Public Security better known as the Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, or UB (Office of Security).
After these changes, the main structure responsible for political police, counter-intelligence, intelligence, criminal police, border guards, correctional facilities, and fire rescue was the Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych or MSW, (Ministry of Internal Affairs), which had been established two years earlier (in 1954) for administrative duties. Służba Bezpieczeństwa became the III Department of MSW.
SB activities
After it was renamed as the SB in 1956, it entered a period of relative inaction during the era of reform instituted by Władysław Gomułka. However, after 1968, it was revived as a stronger body and became responsible for implementing political repression, most notably in the case of the Solidarity movement, the leader of which, Lech Wałęsa, was under constant SB surveillance, until its replacement by the Urząd Ochrony Państwa in 1990 after the fall of communism.
SB replaced the earlier Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (UB, Security Office (UBP, Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, official name {Public Security Office})) which was the regional branches name of the Ministry of Public Security of Poland (Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego). Until 1990, the name Urząd Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (UBP) has remained the common form of plural ubecy /oo-beh-tsi/ singular ubek /oo-beh-ck/ referring to the SB, and its agents were referred to as esbecy /es-beh-tsi/ plural, singular esbek /es-beh-ck/).
It was replaced by the Urząd Ochrony Państwa in 1990 after the fall of communism.
History
Służba Bezpieczeństwa (lit. "Security Service", functioning as Secret Police) was established in November 1956 after the dissolution of the Komitet do spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (Committee for Public Security), which was responsible for the political police, counter-intelligence, intelligence, personal protection and confidential communications. It was the well-known successor of Ministry of Public Security better known as the Urząd Bezpieczeństwa, or UB (Office of Security).
After these changes, the main structure responsible for political police, counter-intelligence, intelligence, criminal police, border guards, correctional facilities, and fire rescue was the Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych or MSW, (Ministry of Internal Affairs), which had been established two years earlier (in 1954) for administrative duties. Służba Bezpieczeństwa became the III Department of MSW.
SB activities
After it was renamed as the SB in 1956, it entered a period of relative inaction during the era of reform instituted by Władysław Gomułka. However, after 1968, it was revived as a stronger body and became responsible for implementing political repression, most notably in the case of the Solidarity movement, the leader of which, Lech Wałęsa, was under constant SB surveillance, until its replacement by the Urząd Ochrony Państwa in 1990 after the fall of communism.
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Operation Simoom
Operation Simoom (Polish: Operacja Samum) was a top secret Polish intelligence operation conducted in Iraq in 1990.
In 1990 the CIA asked European intelligence agencies to assist in the withdrawal of six American operatives (a mix of CIA and DIA officers) investigating Iraqi troops movements in Iraq before the Gulf War (WP 1995). Several countries, such as Russia, Great Britain, and France refused to help in such a dangerous operation; only Poland agreed to help (WP 1995). The operation was very risky because if the cover were to be blown, all operatives were likely to be killed.
Poland had ties throughout Iraq because of construction work carried out there by Polish engineering companies (WP 1995) and sent a few operatives to start working on the operation. Gromosław Czempiński (WV 1999) became the commander of this operation, assigned to it by Polish Minister of Internal Affairs and first chief of Urząd Ochrony Państwa, Krzysztof Kozłowski (WP 1995). Ironically, Czempiński has previously been a spy in the United States and either took part or led many operations against the Western intelligence services (WP 1995). The main plan was to reestablish contact with the hiding American spies and give them Polish passports so they could escape from Iraq in a bus, alongside Polish and Russian workers.
The escape came after the six agents spent weeks on the run in Kuwait and Baghdad (WP 1995). The operation was very difficult because the Iraqis started to suspect some kind of American-Polish intrigue (WP 1995).
The agents were given refuge at a Polish construction camp, and then provided with passports and put on a refugee bus. An Iraqi officer at checkpoint on the border had studied in Poland and spoke Polish well enough to communicate. When the bus arrived at the border, he asked one of the American spies a question in Polish. Since the spy did not know Polish at all, he pretended to be heavily drunk (another version states that the operative in question fainted). Nevertheless, the bus managed to cross the border with all occupants (WP 1995). Poles moved the agents out of Iraq and into the safety of Turkey (WP 1995). Operatives from both sides returned to their countries. Polish forces rescued not only the agents but also secret maps—detailed maps of Baghdad and particulars about military installations scattered throughout Iraq—apparently crucial for Operation Desert Storm. (WP 1995, WV 1999)
As a reward for Poland's help, the US government promised to cancel half, or $16.5 billion, of Poland's foreign debt (NYT 1995).
In at least two other operations, the Poles later aided another 15 foreigners to escape, mostly Britons, held hostage by the Iraqis as part of Saddam Hussein's "human shield" campaign to deter an allied invasion. (WP 1995)
Information about this operation was first revealed in 1995 by The Washington Post (NYT 1995, WV 1999). In 1999, Polish director Władysław Pasikowski made a movie, Operacja Samum about this operation; it was the first Polish production co-financed by Warner Bros. and third by HBO (WV 1999).
In 1990 the CIA asked European intelligence agencies to assist in the withdrawal of six American operatives (a mix of CIA and DIA officers) investigating Iraqi troops movements in Iraq before the Gulf War (WP 1995). Several countries, such as Russia, Great Britain, and France refused to help in such a dangerous operation; only Poland agreed to help (WP 1995). The operation was very risky because if the cover were to be blown, all operatives were likely to be killed.
Poland had ties throughout Iraq because of construction work carried out there by Polish engineering companies (WP 1995) and sent a few operatives to start working on the operation. Gromosław Czempiński (WV 1999) became the commander of this operation, assigned to it by Polish Minister of Internal Affairs and first chief of Urząd Ochrony Państwa, Krzysztof Kozłowski (WP 1995). Ironically, Czempiński has previously been a spy in the United States and either took part or led many operations against the Western intelligence services (WP 1995). The main plan was to reestablish contact with the hiding American spies and give them Polish passports so they could escape from Iraq in a bus, alongside Polish and Russian workers.
The escape came after the six agents spent weeks on the run in Kuwait and Baghdad (WP 1995). The operation was very difficult because the Iraqis started to suspect some kind of American-Polish intrigue (WP 1995).
The agents were given refuge at a Polish construction camp, and then provided with passports and put on a refugee bus. An Iraqi officer at checkpoint on the border had studied in Poland and spoke Polish well enough to communicate. When the bus arrived at the border, he asked one of the American spies a question in Polish. Since the spy did not know Polish at all, he pretended to be heavily drunk (another version states that the operative in question fainted). Nevertheless, the bus managed to cross the border with all occupants (WP 1995). Poles moved the agents out of Iraq and into the safety of Turkey (WP 1995). Operatives from both sides returned to their countries. Polish forces rescued not only the agents but also secret maps—detailed maps of Baghdad and particulars about military installations scattered throughout Iraq—apparently crucial for Operation Desert Storm. (WP 1995, WV 1999)
As a reward for Poland's help, the US government promised to cancel half, or $16.5 billion, of Poland's foreign debt (NYT 1995).
In at least two other operations, the Poles later aided another 15 foreigners to escape, mostly Britons, held hostage by the Iraqis as part of Saddam Hussein's "human shield" campaign to deter an allied invasion. (WP 1995)
Information about this operation was first revealed in 1995 by The Washington Post (NYT 1995, WV 1999). In 1999, Polish director Władysław Pasikowski made a movie, Operacja Samum about this operation; it was the first Polish production co-financed by Warner Bros. and third by HBO (WV 1999).
History of Polish intelligence services Part IV
1945–89
Civillian branches
On occupying Poland and installaing a puppet government, the Soviet Union created new Polish intelligence and internal-security agencies. The Soviet special services had begun training Polish officers as early as 1943. That year, some 120 Poles had begun training at an NKVD school in Kuybyshev (now Samara). At the same time, in NKVD-NKGB schools all over the USSR, hundreds of Germans, Romanians, Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians had also undergone the same training in order to prepare them for work in future special services in their respective countries.
In July 1944 in Moscow the temporary Polish puppet government was established by the name of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego), or PKWN. The PKWN was organized as thirteen departments (resorty). One of them was the Department of Public Security (Resort Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego), or RBP, headed by long-time Polish communist Stanisław Radkiewicz. The largest and the most important department in the RBP, Department 1, was responsible for counter-espionage and headed by Roman Romkowski. By September 1945 Department 1 had become so large that three additional departments were created, as well as two separate Sections. By the close of 1944, the Department of Public Security totaled 3000 employees.
On December 31, 1944, the PKWN was joined by several members of the Polish government in exile, among them Stanisław Mikołajczyk. It was then transformed into the Provisional Government of Republic of Poland (Rząd Tymczasowy Republiki Polskiej, or RTRP), and the departments were renamed as ministries.
The Ministry of Public Security was responsible for both intelligence and counter-espionage, as well as surveillance of citizens and suppression of dissent. They generally did not employ former officers of the "Dwojka" or follow the traditions of pre-war Polish intelligence services. Personnel were recruited for their "political reliability". New formations were trained by Soviet NKVD experts. Additionally, and especially in the early years (1945–49), Soviet officers in Polish uniforms overlooked their operations. After Stalin's death in 1953 and the later defection of Col. Józef Światło, the Ministry of Public Security was canceled and replaced by two separate administrations - the Committee for Public Security (Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, or Kds.BP) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych or MSW).
The Kds.BP was responsible for intelligence and government protection and. From September 3, 1955 to 28 November, 1956, the Main Directorate of Information of the Polish Army (Główny Zarząd Informacji Wojska Polskiego), which was responsible for the military police and counter-espionage agency, was also controlled by the Kds.BP. The MSW was responsible for the supervision of local governments, Militsiya, correctional facilities, fire rescue and the border and internal guards.
The next big changes came in 1956. The Committee for Public Security was canceled and the Ministry of Internal Affairs took over their responsibilities. The MSW assumed control of the political police, under the Służba Bezpieczeństwa.
From 1956 to the fall of communism in Poland the MSW was one of the biggest and strongest administrations. During this period its responsibilities included intelligence, counter-espionage, anti-state activity (SB), government protection, confidential communications, supervision of the local governments, militsiya, correctional facilities, and fire rescue. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was divided into departments. The most important of these were the first second and third departments. The first dealt with foreign operations and intelligence gathering, the second with spy activities both by Poland and other countries and the third was responsible for anti-state activities and the protection of the country's secrets.
With the exception of its own departments and sections, the MSW also had control over the Militsiya (Komenda Główna Milicji Obywatelskiej or KG/MO), fire rescue (Komenda Główna Straży Pożarnych or KG/SP), territorial anti-aircraft defense, (Komenda Główna Terenowej Obrony Przeciwlotniczej KG/TOP), management of geodesy and cartography, (Główny Zarząd Geodezji i Kartografii) and health services (Centralny Zarząd Służby Zdrowia). Ministry of Internal Affairs also had control over the command of the Internal Security Corp. (Dowództwo Korpusu Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego or KBW), command of the Border Guard (Dowództwo Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza or KOP), and management of Information of Internal Troops (Zarząd Informacji Wojsk Wewnetrznych). Through the 1980s the MSW had 24,390 staff in Security Services, 62,276 in the Citizen's Militsiya, 12,566 in Motorized Reserves of the Citizens Militia (Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej, or ZOMO), 20,673 in Administratively-Economic Units (Jednostki administracyjno-gospodarcze) and 4,594 in ministry schools, not including students.
Military branches
The first military special services in Poland after World War II were created in 1943 as part of the Polish Military in the USSR. First organ that dealt with military counterespionage was called Directorate of Information by the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army (Zarząd Informacji Naczelnego Dowódcy Wojska Polskiego, or ZI NDWP). On November 30, 1944, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, general Michał Rola-Żymierski, transformed the ZI NDWP into the Main Directorate of Information of the Polish Army (Główny Zarząd Informacji Wojska Polskiego, or GZI WP) in his 95th order. From 30 November, 1950, the GZI WP became the Main Directorate of Information of the Ministry of Defense (Główny Zarząd Informacji Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, or GZI MON). In September 1955 GZI MON became part of the Committee for Public Security (Komitet do spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego), which was the successor of Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, more commonly known as the Urząd Bezpieczeństwa or UB, and the name was changed to the Main Directorate of Information of the Committee for Public Security, or GZI KdsBP. In November 1956 the GZI Kds.BP separated from the Committee for Public Security, and returned to its previous role, becoming again the Main Directorate of Information of the Ministry of Defense. After the reform instituted by Władysław Gomułka in 1956, and the role the GZI played in repressions and executions, the Main Directorate of Information of Ministry of Defense was canceled in 1957 and replaced by the Military Internal Service (Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna, or WSW). The WSW continuously operated as the main military police and counterespionage service until the fall of communism in Poland.
The first Polish Military Intelligence after World War II was the Second Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army (Oddział II Sztabu Generalnego Ludowego Wojska Polskiego, or Odział II Szt Gen LWP) and bore the same name as its precursor from before the war. Odział II Szt Gen WP was establish on July 18, 1945, but its origins can be traced to May 1943, when the first reconnaissance company was created in Polish Army units in the USSR. Between July 1947 and June 5, 1950, the Second Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army operated within the structure of the Ministry of Public Security together with the civilian intelligence branch as Department VII. On June 5, 1950, it returned to the Ministry of Defense. The first head of Odział II Szt Gen WP was Colonel Gieorgij Domeradzki. In November 1945 this position was occupied by General Wacław Komar, and between October 1950 and March 1951 by soviet officer Konstantin Kahnikov. The last commander of the Second Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army was Igor Suchacki.
On November 15, 1951, Polish Defence Minister Konstantin Rokossovsky (in his 88th order) transformed the Second Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army to Second Directorate of General Staff of the Polish Army (Zarząd II Sztabu Generalnego Wojska Polskiego). Internal organization was transformed from sections to directorates and intelligence work among the United States, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria was expanded to countries such as Norway, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Israel. In 1990 the Second Directorate of General Staff of the Polish Army was join with the Military Internal Service (Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna, or WSW), in order to have intelligence and counter-intelligence working under one structure as the Second Directorate for Intelligence and Counter-intelligence (Zarząd II Wywiadu i Kontrwywiadu). In 1991 the Second Directorate for Intelligence and Counter-intelligence was transformed into Military Information Services (Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne, or WSI), and continues to function under this name.
1989–present
After the changes of 1989 the Służba Bezpieczeństwa was disbanded by the first free government under the prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. A new agency, called the State Protection Office (Urząd Ochrony Państwa, or UOP) was formed and staffed mainly by the former SB officers who successfully passed a verification procedure. Its mission was primarily general espionage and intelligence gathering as well as counter-espionage and fighting against high ranked organized crime. It was commanded by a career intelligence officer but was directly supervised by a civilian government official, Coordinator for the Special Services.
Most of the time the agency evaded public attention, although it was dragged into political fighting over appointments of its chiefs, lustration and some perceived failures with organized crime cases. In 2002 the new, post-communist left-wing government reorganized the special services by dividing them into two agencies; the Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) and Intelligence Agency (Agencja Wywiadu). The move was widely perceived as a way of cleansing the higher ranks of the officers appointed by previous right-wing governments.
The military intelligence continued to function under a slightly altered name (Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne- Military Information Services) and without much organizational change; at least none that was visible to the general public. The new Polish conservative government declared dissolution of the WSI and creating new services in October 2005, since the agency skipped serious external reforms after the collapse of communism in 1989. Throughout the transformation the WSI were allegedly involved in dubious operations, arms sales to UN-sanctioned states and corruption scandals. In 2006 the WSI was split into Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego and Służba Wywiadu Wojskowego.
Civillian branches
On occupying Poland and installaing a puppet government, the Soviet Union created new Polish intelligence and internal-security agencies. The Soviet special services had begun training Polish officers as early as 1943. That year, some 120 Poles had begun training at an NKVD school in Kuybyshev (now Samara). At the same time, in NKVD-NKGB schools all over the USSR, hundreds of Germans, Romanians, Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians had also undergone the same training in order to prepare them for work in future special services in their respective countries.
In July 1944 in Moscow the temporary Polish puppet government was established by the name of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego), or PKWN. The PKWN was organized as thirteen departments (resorty). One of them was the Department of Public Security (Resort Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego), or RBP, headed by long-time Polish communist Stanisław Radkiewicz. The largest and the most important department in the RBP, Department 1, was responsible for counter-espionage and headed by Roman Romkowski. By September 1945 Department 1 had become so large that three additional departments were created, as well as two separate Sections. By the close of 1944, the Department of Public Security totaled 3000 employees.
On December 31, 1944, the PKWN was joined by several members of the Polish government in exile, among them Stanisław Mikołajczyk. It was then transformed into the Provisional Government of Republic of Poland (Rząd Tymczasowy Republiki Polskiej, or RTRP), and the departments were renamed as ministries.
The Ministry of Public Security was responsible for both intelligence and counter-espionage, as well as surveillance of citizens and suppression of dissent. They generally did not employ former officers of the "Dwojka" or follow the traditions of pre-war Polish intelligence services. Personnel were recruited for their "political reliability". New formations were trained by Soviet NKVD experts. Additionally, and especially in the early years (1945–49), Soviet officers in Polish uniforms overlooked their operations. After Stalin's death in 1953 and the later defection of Col. Józef Światło, the Ministry of Public Security was canceled and replaced by two separate administrations - the Committee for Public Security (Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, or Kds.BP) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych or MSW).
The Kds.BP was responsible for intelligence and government protection and. From September 3, 1955 to 28 November, 1956, the Main Directorate of Information of the Polish Army (Główny Zarząd Informacji Wojska Polskiego), which was responsible for the military police and counter-espionage agency, was also controlled by the Kds.BP. The MSW was responsible for the supervision of local governments, Militsiya, correctional facilities, fire rescue and the border and internal guards.
The next big changes came in 1956. The Committee for Public Security was canceled and the Ministry of Internal Affairs took over their responsibilities. The MSW assumed control of the political police, under the Służba Bezpieczeństwa.
From 1956 to the fall of communism in Poland the MSW was one of the biggest and strongest administrations. During this period its responsibilities included intelligence, counter-espionage, anti-state activity (SB), government protection, confidential communications, supervision of the local governments, militsiya, correctional facilities, and fire rescue. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was divided into departments. The most important of these were the first second and third departments. The first dealt with foreign operations and intelligence gathering, the second with spy activities both by Poland and other countries and the third was responsible for anti-state activities and the protection of the country's secrets.
With the exception of its own departments and sections, the MSW also had control over the Militsiya (Komenda Główna Milicji Obywatelskiej or KG/MO), fire rescue (Komenda Główna Straży Pożarnych or KG/SP), territorial anti-aircraft defense, (Komenda Główna Terenowej Obrony Przeciwlotniczej KG/TOP), management of geodesy and cartography, (Główny Zarząd Geodezji i Kartografii) and health services (Centralny Zarząd Służby Zdrowia). Ministry of Internal Affairs also had control over the command of the Internal Security Corp. (Dowództwo Korpusu Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego or KBW), command of the Border Guard (Dowództwo Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza or KOP), and management of Information of Internal Troops (Zarząd Informacji Wojsk Wewnetrznych). Through the 1980s the MSW had 24,390 staff in Security Services, 62,276 in the Citizen's Militsiya, 12,566 in Motorized Reserves of the Citizens Militia (Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej, or ZOMO), 20,673 in Administratively-Economic Units (Jednostki administracyjno-gospodarcze) and 4,594 in ministry schools, not including students.
Military branches
The first military special services in Poland after World War II were created in 1943 as part of the Polish Military in the USSR. First organ that dealt with military counterespionage was called Directorate of Information by the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army (Zarząd Informacji Naczelnego Dowódcy Wojska Polskiego, or ZI NDWP). On November 30, 1944, the commander-in-chief of the Polish Army, general Michał Rola-Żymierski, transformed the ZI NDWP into the Main Directorate of Information of the Polish Army (Główny Zarząd Informacji Wojska Polskiego, or GZI WP) in his 95th order. From 30 November, 1950, the GZI WP became the Main Directorate of Information of the Ministry of Defense (Główny Zarząd Informacji Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, or GZI MON). In September 1955 GZI MON became part of the Committee for Public Security (Komitet do spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego), which was the successor of Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego, more commonly known as the Urząd Bezpieczeństwa or UB, and the name was changed to the Main Directorate of Information of the Committee for Public Security, or GZI KdsBP. In November 1956 the GZI Kds.BP separated from the Committee for Public Security, and returned to its previous role, becoming again the Main Directorate of Information of the Ministry of Defense. After the reform instituted by Władysław Gomułka in 1956, and the role the GZI played in repressions and executions, the Main Directorate of Information of Ministry of Defense was canceled in 1957 and replaced by the Military Internal Service (Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna, or WSW). The WSW continuously operated as the main military police and counterespionage service until the fall of communism in Poland.
The first Polish Military Intelligence after World War II was the Second Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army (Oddział II Sztabu Generalnego Ludowego Wojska Polskiego, or Odział II Szt Gen LWP) and bore the same name as its precursor from before the war. Odział II Szt Gen WP was establish on July 18, 1945, but its origins can be traced to May 1943, when the first reconnaissance company was created in Polish Army units in the USSR. Between July 1947 and June 5, 1950, the Second Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army operated within the structure of the Ministry of Public Security together with the civilian intelligence branch as Department VII. On June 5, 1950, it returned to the Ministry of Defense. The first head of Odział II Szt Gen WP was Colonel Gieorgij Domeradzki. In November 1945 this position was occupied by General Wacław Komar, and between October 1950 and March 1951 by soviet officer Konstantin Kahnikov. The last commander of the Second Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army was Igor Suchacki.
On November 15, 1951, Polish Defence Minister Konstantin Rokossovsky (in his 88th order) transformed the Second Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army to Second Directorate of General Staff of the Polish Army (Zarząd II Sztabu Generalnego Wojska Polskiego). Internal organization was transformed from sections to directorates and intelligence work among the United States, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria was expanded to countries such as Norway, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Israel. In 1990 the Second Directorate of General Staff of the Polish Army was join with the Military Internal Service (Wojskowa Służba Wewnętrzna, or WSW), in order to have intelligence and counter-intelligence working under one structure as the Second Directorate for Intelligence and Counter-intelligence (Zarząd II Wywiadu i Kontrwywiadu). In 1991 the Second Directorate for Intelligence and Counter-intelligence was transformed into Military Information Services (Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne, or WSI), and continues to function under this name.
1989–present
After the changes of 1989 the Służba Bezpieczeństwa was disbanded by the first free government under the prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. A new agency, called the State Protection Office (Urząd Ochrony Państwa, or UOP) was formed and staffed mainly by the former SB officers who successfully passed a verification procedure. Its mission was primarily general espionage and intelligence gathering as well as counter-espionage and fighting against high ranked organized crime. It was commanded by a career intelligence officer but was directly supervised by a civilian government official, Coordinator for the Special Services.
Most of the time the agency evaded public attention, although it was dragged into political fighting over appointments of its chiefs, lustration and some perceived failures with organized crime cases. In 2002 the new, post-communist left-wing government reorganized the special services by dividing them into two agencies; the Internal Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) and Intelligence Agency (Agencja Wywiadu). The move was widely perceived as a way of cleansing the higher ranks of the officers appointed by previous right-wing governments.
The military intelligence continued to function under a slightly altered name (Wojskowe Służby Informacyjne- Military Information Services) and without much organizational change; at least none that was visible to the general public. The new Polish conservative government declared dissolution of the WSI and creating new services in October 2005, since the agency skipped serious external reforms after the collapse of communism in 1989. Throughout the transformation the WSI were allegedly involved in dubious operations, arms sales to UN-sanctioned states and corruption scandals. In 2006 the WSI was split into Służba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego and Służba Wywiadu Wojskowego.
History of Polish intelligence services Part III
1939–45
Until 1939 Polish intelligence services did not, as a rule, collaborate with the intelligence services of other countries. A partial exception was France, Poland's closest ally; even then cooperation was lukewarm, with neither side sharing their most precious secrets. An important exception was the long-term collaboration between France's Gustave Bertrand and Poland's Cipher Bureau, headed by Gwido Langer. The situation only began to change in 1939, when war appeared certain and Britain and France entered into a formal military alliance with Poland. The most important result of the subsequent information-sharing was the disclosure to France and Britain of Polish techniques and equipment for breaking German Enigma machine ciphers.
The initial break into the Enigma ciphers had been made in late 1932 by mathematician Marian Rejewski, working for the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau. His work was facilitated, perhaps decisively, by intelligence provided by Bertrand. With the help of fellow mathematicians Henryk Zygalski and Jerzy Różycki, Rejewski developed techniques to decrypt German Enigma-enciphered messages on a regular and timely basis.
Six-and-a-half years after the initial Polish decryption of Enigma ciphers, French and British intelligence representatives were briefed on Polish achievements at a trilateral conference held at Cipher Bureau facilities in the Kabaty Woods, just south of Warsaw, on July 26, 1939, barely five weeks before the outbreak of World War II. This formed the basis for early Enigma decryption by the British at Bletchley Park, northwest of London. Without the head start provided by Poland, British reading of Enigma encryptions might have been delayed several years, if it had gotten off the ground at all.
Key Polish Cipher Bureau personnel escaped from Poland on September 17, 1939, on the Soviet Union's entry into eastern Poland, and eventually reached France. There, at "PC Bruno" outside Paris, they resumed cracking Enigma ciphers through the "Phony War" (October 1939 — May 1940). Following the fall of northern France to the Germans, the Polish-French-Spanish cryptological organization, sponsored by French Major Gustave Bertrand, continued its work at "Cadix" in the Vichy "Free Zone" until it was occupied by German forces in November 1942.
After the 1939 invasion of Poland, practically all of the General Staff's Section II (Intelligence) command apparatus managed to escape to Romania and soon reached France and Britain. Reactivating agent networks throughout Europe, they immediately began cooperating with French and British intelligence agencies. After the subsequent fall of France, most of Section II ended up in Britain.
At that time Britain was in a difficult situation, badly in need of intelligence from occupied Europe after rapid German advances had disrupted its networks and put German forces into areas where Britain had few agents. Following the personal intervention of Churchill and Sikorski in September 1940, cooperation between British and Polish intelligence organizations entered a new phase.
The Poles placed their Section II at the disposal of the British, but as a quid pro quo requested and obtained (at that time without any reservations) the right to use, without British oversight, their own ciphers which they had developed in France. The Poles were the only Allied country that was given this unique status, though as the war progressed it was challenged by some agencies of the British government. Due to support from members of the British Special Operations Executive, the Poles kept their ciphers to the end of hostilities.
In the first half of 1941 Polish agents in France supplied Britain with intelligence on U-boat movements from French Atlantic ports. The Polish network in France grew to 1,500 members and, before and during Operation Overlord, supplied vital information about the German military in France. Agents working in Poland in the spring of 1941 supplied extensive intelligence about German preparations to invade the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa).
Polish spies also documented German atrocities being perpetrated at Auschwitz (Witold Pilecki's report) and elsewhere in Poland against Jewish and non-Jewish populations. Polish intelligence gave the British crucial information on Germany's secret-weapons projects, including the V-1 and V-2 rockets, enabling Britain to set back these German programs by bombing the main development facility at Peenemünde in 1943. Poland's networks supplied the western Allies with intelligence on nearly all aspects of the German war effort. Of 45,770 reports received by British intelligence during the war, nearly half (22,047) came from Polish agents.
On March 15, 1946, Section II was officially disbanded, and its archives were taken over by Britain. At Section II's dissolution, it had 170 officers and 3,500 agents, excluding headquarters staff. Very likely at least some of the Polish agents continued working directly for Britain during the Cold War.
The Polish intelligence contribution to Britain's war effort was kept secret due to Cold War exigencies. In later years, as official British histories were released, the Polish intelligence role barely rated a mention. Only when British wartime decryption of Enigma ciphers was made public in the 1970s, did a Polish contribution begin to become known; even then, however, the early versions published in Britain (and some versions even to the end of the 20th century) claimed that Polish intelligence had only been able to steal a German Enigma machine. The truth, which had previously been disclosed in Bertrand's book and would later be detailed in papers by Marian Rejewski (who had survived the war and lived to 1980), made slow headway against British and American obfuscations, mendacities and fabrications. The Polish Enigma-breaking effort had been much more sophisticated than those English-language accounts made out, and had in fact relied largely on mathematical analysis.
Historians' efforts to gain access to documentation of other Polish intelligence operations met with British stonewalling and with claims that the pertinent Polish archives had been destroyed by the British.
More recently, the British and Polish governments have begun jointly producing an accurate account of the Polish intelligence contribution to Britain's war effort. The key Anglo-Polish Historical Committee Report on the subject was published in July 2005. It was written by leading historians and experts who had been granted unprecedented access to British intelligence archives. The report concluded that 43 percent of all reports received by British secret services from continental Europe in 1939-45 had come from Polish sources.
Until 1939 Polish intelligence services did not, as a rule, collaborate with the intelligence services of other countries. A partial exception was France, Poland's closest ally; even then cooperation was lukewarm, with neither side sharing their most precious secrets. An important exception was the long-term collaboration between France's Gustave Bertrand and Poland's Cipher Bureau, headed by Gwido Langer. The situation only began to change in 1939, when war appeared certain and Britain and France entered into a formal military alliance with Poland. The most important result of the subsequent information-sharing was the disclosure to France and Britain of Polish techniques and equipment for breaking German Enigma machine ciphers.
The initial break into the Enigma ciphers had been made in late 1932 by mathematician Marian Rejewski, working for the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau. His work was facilitated, perhaps decisively, by intelligence provided by Bertrand. With the help of fellow mathematicians Henryk Zygalski and Jerzy Różycki, Rejewski developed techniques to decrypt German Enigma-enciphered messages on a regular and timely basis.
Six-and-a-half years after the initial Polish decryption of Enigma ciphers, French and British intelligence representatives were briefed on Polish achievements at a trilateral conference held at Cipher Bureau facilities in the Kabaty Woods, just south of Warsaw, on July 26, 1939, barely five weeks before the outbreak of World War II. This formed the basis for early Enigma decryption by the British at Bletchley Park, northwest of London. Without the head start provided by Poland, British reading of Enigma encryptions might have been delayed several years, if it had gotten off the ground at all.
Key Polish Cipher Bureau personnel escaped from Poland on September 17, 1939, on the Soviet Union's entry into eastern Poland, and eventually reached France. There, at "PC Bruno" outside Paris, they resumed cracking Enigma ciphers through the "Phony War" (October 1939 — May 1940). Following the fall of northern France to the Germans, the Polish-French-Spanish cryptological organization, sponsored by French Major Gustave Bertrand, continued its work at "Cadix" in the Vichy "Free Zone" until it was occupied by German forces in November 1942.
After the 1939 invasion of Poland, practically all of the General Staff's Section II (Intelligence) command apparatus managed to escape to Romania and soon reached France and Britain. Reactivating agent networks throughout Europe, they immediately began cooperating with French and British intelligence agencies. After the subsequent fall of France, most of Section II ended up in Britain.
At that time Britain was in a difficult situation, badly in need of intelligence from occupied Europe after rapid German advances had disrupted its networks and put German forces into areas where Britain had few agents. Following the personal intervention of Churchill and Sikorski in September 1940, cooperation between British and Polish intelligence organizations entered a new phase.
The Poles placed their Section II at the disposal of the British, but as a quid pro quo requested and obtained (at that time without any reservations) the right to use, without British oversight, their own ciphers which they had developed in France. The Poles were the only Allied country that was given this unique status, though as the war progressed it was challenged by some agencies of the British government. Due to support from members of the British Special Operations Executive, the Poles kept their ciphers to the end of hostilities.
In the first half of 1941 Polish agents in France supplied Britain with intelligence on U-boat movements from French Atlantic ports. The Polish network in France grew to 1,500 members and, before and during Operation Overlord, supplied vital information about the German military in France. Agents working in Poland in the spring of 1941 supplied extensive intelligence about German preparations to invade the Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa).
Polish spies also documented German atrocities being perpetrated at Auschwitz (Witold Pilecki's report) and elsewhere in Poland against Jewish and non-Jewish populations. Polish intelligence gave the British crucial information on Germany's secret-weapons projects, including the V-1 and V-2 rockets, enabling Britain to set back these German programs by bombing the main development facility at Peenemünde in 1943. Poland's networks supplied the western Allies with intelligence on nearly all aspects of the German war effort. Of 45,770 reports received by British intelligence during the war, nearly half (22,047) came from Polish agents.
On March 15, 1946, Section II was officially disbanded, and its archives were taken over by Britain. At Section II's dissolution, it had 170 officers and 3,500 agents, excluding headquarters staff. Very likely at least some of the Polish agents continued working directly for Britain during the Cold War.
The Polish intelligence contribution to Britain's war effort was kept secret due to Cold War exigencies. In later years, as official British histories were released, the Polish intelligence role barely rated a mention. Only when British wartime decryption of Enigma ciphers was made public in the 1970s, did a Polish contribution begin to become known; even then, however, the early versions published in Britain (and some versions even to the end of the 20th century) claimed that Polish intelligence had only been able to steal a German Enigma machine. The truth, which had previously been disclosed in Bertrand's book and would later be detailed in papers by Marian Rejewski (who had survived the war and lived to 1980), made slow headway against British and American obfuscations, mendacities and fabrications. The Polish Enigma-breaking effort had been much more sophisticated than those English-language accounts made out, and had in fact relied largely on mathematical analysis.
Historians' efforts to gain access to documentation of other Polish intelligence operations met with British stonewalling and with claims that the pertinent Polish archives had been destroyed by the British.
More recently, the British and Polish governments have begun jointly producing an accurate account of the Polish intelligence contribution to Britain's war effort. The key Anglo-Polish Historical Committee Report on the subject was published in July 2005. It was written by leading historians and experts who had been granted unprecedented access to British intelligence archives. The report concluded that 43 percent of all reports received by British secret services from continental Europe in 1939-45 had come from Polish sources.
History of Polish intelligence services Part II
1918–21
Immediately upon achieving independence in 1918, Poland established armed forces. Reflecting the influence of the French Military Mission to Poland, the Polish General Staff was divided into sections entrusted with specific tasks:
1. Oddział I (Section I) – Organization and mobilization;
2. Oddział II (Section II) – Intelligence and counterintelligence;
3. Oddziału III (Section III) – Training and operations;
4. Oddział IV (Section IV) – Quartermaster.
Section II (colloquially, "Dwójka," "Two") was formed in October 1918, even before Poland had declared her independence. Initially called the "General Staff Information Department," Section II was divided into "sections" (sekcje):
* Sekcja I – Reconnaissance and close intelligence;
* Sekcja II
o IIa (East) – Offensive intelligence for Bolshevik Russia, Lithuania, the Belarusian People's Republic, Ukraine and Galicia;
o IIb (West) – Offensive intelligence for Austria, Germany, France and the United Kingdom;
* Sekcja III – General intelligence and surveillance abroad (East and West);
* Sekcja IV – Preparation of a front-line bulletin;
* Sekcja V – Contacts with military and civilian authorities;
* Sekcja VI – Contacts with attachés in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Moscow and Kiev;
* Sekcja VII – Ciphers (i.e., cryptology).
An extensive network of domestic and foreign informants developed rapidly. This was due to Poland's poor economic situation, itself the result of over a century of foreign occupation. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Poland's economic and political situation had forced hundreds of thousands to emigrate. With the advent of Polish independence, many émigrés offered their services to Polish intelligence agencies. Others Poles who had been living in the former Russian Empire and were now making their way home through war-torn Russia, provided priceless intelligence on the logistics, order of battle and status of the parties in the Russian Civil War.
In Western Europe (especially in Germany, France and Belgium) the Polish diaspora often formed the backbone of heavy industry; some one million people of Polish descent lived in the Ruhr Valley alone. Many of these provided intelligence on industrial production and economic conditions.
After the outbreak of the Polish-Soviet War in early 1919, intelligence from the east proved vital to Poland's survival against a far superior enemy. A separate organization was formed within Polish Intelligence, taking over most intelligence duties for the duration of the war. This was a Biuro Wywiadowcze (Intelligence Bureau) comprising seven departments:
1. Organisation;
2. Offensive Intelligence "A";
3. Offensive Intelligence "B";
4. Offensive Intelligence "C";
5. Defensive Intelligence;
6. Internal propaganda;
7. Counterintelligence.
The fourth department, Offensive Intelligence "C", became the most developed because it carried out all the duties connected with "front-line" reconnaissance and intelligence, as well as "long-range" intelligence and surveillance in countries surrounding Bolshevik Russia, including Siberia (still in the hands of the White Russians), Turkey, Persia, China, Mongolia and Japan.
The third department, Offensive Intelligence "B," controlled an intelligence network in European Russia.
Additional intelligence was obtained from Russian defectors and prisoners of war who crossed the Polish lines in their thousands, especially after the 1920 Battle of Warsaw.
1921–39
After the Polish–Soviet War and the Treaty of Riga, Polish Intelligence had to restructure to cope with new challenges. Though Poland had won most of her border conflicts (most notably the war with Russia and the Greater Poland Uprising of 1918-19 against Germany), her international situation was unenviable. By mid-1921, Section II had been restructured into three main departments, each overseeing a number of offices:
* Organization Department:
1. Organization;
2. Training;
3. Personnel;
4. Finances;
5. Polish ciphers and codes, communication, and foreign press.
* Information Department:
1. East;
2. West;
3. North;
4. South;
5. Statistics office;
6. Nationalities and minorities;
* Intelligence Department:
1. Intelligence technology;
2. Central agents' bureau;
3. Counterintelligence;
4. Foreign cryptography (Biuro Szyfrów);
5. Radio intelligence and wire-tapping.
Until the late 1930s the Soviet Union was seen as the most likely aggressor and Poland's main adversary. Section II developed an extensive network of agents within Poland's eastern neighbor and other adjoining countries. In the early 1920s Polish intelligence began developing a network for "offensive intelligence." The Eastern Office (Referat "Wschód") had several dozen bureaus, mostly attached to Polish consulates in Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, Kharkov and Tbilisi.
Short-range reconnaissance was carried out by the Border Defense Corps, created in 1924. On a number of occasions, soldiers crossed the border disguised as smugglers, partisans or bandits. They gathered information on the disposition of Soviet troops and the morale of the Soviet populace. At the same time, Soviet forces carried out analogous missions on Polish soil. The situation finally stabilized in 1925; however, such missions continued to occur occasionally.
Polish Intelligence produced fairly accurate pictures of the capabilities of Poland's main potential adversaries—Germany and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, this information was of little avail when war came in September 1939. Good intelligence could not offset the overwhelming superiority of the German and Soviet armed forces. The conquest of Poland took four weeks—too short a time for intelligence services to make a significant contribution. With Poland conquered, her intelligence services had to evacuate their headquarters to allied French and British territories.
Immediately upon achieving independence in 1918, Poland established armed forces. Reflecting the influence of the French Military Mission to Poland, the Polish General Staff was divided into sections entrusted with specific tasks:
1. Oddział I (Section I) – Organization and mobilization;
2. Oddział II (Section II) – Intelligence and counterintelligence;
3. Oddziału III (Section III) – Training and operations;
4. Oddział IV (Section IV) – Quartermaster.
Section II (colloquially, "Dwójka," "Two") was formed in October 1918, even before Poland had declared her independence. Initially called the "General Staff Information Department," Section II was divided into "sections" (sekcje):
* Sekcja I – Reconnaissance and close intelligence;
* Sekcja II
o IIa (East) – Offensive intelligence for Bolshevik Russia, Lithuania, the Belarusian People's Republic, Ukraine and Galicia;
o IIb (West) – Offensive intelligence for Austria, Germany, France and the United Kingdom;
* Sekcja III – General intelligence and surveillance abroad (East and West);
* Sekcja IV – Preparation of a front-line bulletin;
* Sekcja V – Contacts with military and civilian authorities;
* Sekcja VI – Contacts with attachés in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Moscow and Kiev;
* Sekcja VII – Ciphers (i.e., cryptology).
An extensive network of domestic and foreign informants developed rapidly. This was due to Poland's poor economic situation, itself the result of over a century of foreign occupation. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, Poland's economic and political situation had forced hundreds of thousands to emigrate. With the advent of Polish independence, many émigrés offered their services to Polish intelligence agencies. Others Poles who had been living in the former Russian Empire and were now making their way home through war-torn Russia, provided priceless intelligence on the logistics, order of battle and status of the parties in the Russian Civil War.
In Western Europe (especially in Germany, France and Belgium) the Polish diaspora often formed the backbone of heavy industry; some one million people of Polish descent lived in the Ruhr Valley alone. Many of these provided intelligence on industrial production and economic conditions.
After the outbreak of the Polish-Soviet War in early 1919, intelligence from the east proved vital to Poland's survival against a far superior enemy. A separate organization was formed within Polish Intelligence, taking over most intelligence duties for the duration of the war. This was a Biuro Wywiadowcze (Intelligence Bureau) comprising seven departments:
1. Organisation;
2. Offensive Intelligence "A";
3. Offensive Intelligence "B";
4. Offensive Intelligence "C";
5. Defensive Intelligence;
6. Internal propaganda;
7. Counterintelligence.
The fourth department, Offensive Intelligence "C", became the most developed because it carried out all the duties connected with "front-line" reconnaissance and intelligence, as well as "long-range" intelligence and surveillance in countries surrounding Bolshevik Russia, including Siberia (still in the hands of the White Russians), Turkey, Persia, China, Mongolia and Japan.
The third department, Offensive Intelligence "B," controlled an intelligence network in European Russia.
Additional intelligence was obtained from Russian defectors and prisoners of war who crossed the Polish lines in their thousands, especially after the 1920 Battle of Warsaw.
1921–39
After the Polish–Soviet War and the Treaty of Riga, Polish Intelligence had to restructure to cope with new challenges. Though Poland had won most of her border conflicts (most notably the war with Russia and the Greater Poland Uprising of 1918-19 against Germany), her international situation was unenviable. By mid-1921, Section II had been restructured into three main departments, each overseeing a number of offices:
* Organization Department:
1. Organization;
2. Training;
3. Personnel;
4. Finances;
5. Polish ciphers and codes, communication, and foreign press.
* Information Department:
1. East;
2. West;
3. North;
4. South;
5. Statistics office;
6. Nationalities and minorities;
* Intelligence Department:
1. Intelligence technology;
2. Central agents' bureau;
3. Counterintelligence;
4. Foreign cryptography (Biuro Szyfrów);
5. Radio intelligence and wire-tapping.
Until the late 1930s the Soviet Union was seen as the most likely aggressor and Poland's main adversary. Section II developed an extensive network of agents within Poland's eastern neighbor and other adjoining countries. In the early 1920s Polish intelligence began developing a network for "offensive intelligence." The Eastern Office (Referat "Wschód") had several dozen bureaus, mostly attached to Polish consulates in Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, Kharkov and Tbilisi.
Short-range reconnaissance was carried out by the Border Defense Corps, created in 1924. On a number of occasions, soldiers crossed the border disguised as smugglers, partisans or bandits. They gathered information on the disposition of Soviet troops and the morale of the Soviet populace. At the same time, Soviet forces carried out analogous missions on Polish soil. The situation finally stabilized in 1925; however, such missions continued to occur occasionally.
Polish Intelligence produced fairly accurate pictures of the capabilities of Poland's main potential adversaries—Germany and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, this information was of little avail when war came in September 1939. Good intelligence could not offset the overwhelming superiority of the German and Soviet armed forces. The conquest of Poland took four weeks—too short a time for intelligence services to make a significant contribution. With Poland conquered, her intelligence services had to evacuate their headquarters to allied French and British territories.
History of Polish intelligence services Part I
Commonwealth
Though the first official Polish government service entrusted with espionage, intelligence and counter-intelligence was not formed until 1918, Poland and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had developed networks of informants in neighboring countries. Envoys and ambassadors had also gathered intelligence, often using bribery. Such agents included the 17th-century Polish poet Jan Andrzej Morsztyn.
Polish kings and Polish-Lithuanian military commanders (hetmans) such as Stanisław Koniecpolski maintained intelligence networks. The hetmans were responsible for intelligence-gathering in the Ottoman Empire, its vassal states and disputed territories such as Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania. Intelligence networks also operated in Muscovy and among the restless Cossacks.
In 1683, during the Battle of Vienna, the Polish merchant-spy Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki secured a promise of military assistance for Vienna, besieged by the Turkish forces of Kara Mustafa Pasha, and thus facilitated the victory of a Christian European coaltion led by Polish King Jan III Sobieski. Kulczycki is reported to have received as reward for his services the Turks' supplies of coffee beans and to have established Vienna's first coffee house.
Partitions
During the period when Poland had been partitioned (beginning in 1772, until 1918) by three adjacent empires, intelligence played an important role in patriotic Poles' surveillance of their occupiers and in their planning and conduct of successive Polish uprisings.
1914–18
In 1914 Józef Piłsudski created the Polish Military Organization, an intelligence and special-operations organization which worked alongside the Polish Legions. As such, it was independent of Austro-Hungary and loyal to Piłsudski and to a future independent Poland.
Though the first official Polish government service entrusted with espionage, intelligence and counter-intelligence was not formed until 1918, Poland and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had developed networks of informants in neighboring countries. Envoys and ambassadors had also gathered intelligence, often using bribery. Such agents included the 17th-century Polish poet Jan Andrzej Morsztyn.
Polish kings and Polish-Lithuanian military commanders (hetmans) such as Stanisław Koniecpolski maintained intelligence networks. The hetmans were responsible for intelligence-gathering in the Ottoman Empire, its vassal states and disputed territories such as Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania. Intelligence networks also operated in Muscovy and among the restless Cossacks.
In 1683, during the Battle of Vienna, the Polish merchant-spy Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki secured a promise of military assistance for Vienna, besieged by the Turkish forces of Kara Mustafa Pasha, and thus facilitated the victory of a Christian European coaltion led by Polish King Jan III Sobieski. Kulczycki is reported to have received as reward for his services the Turks' supplies of coffee beans and to have established Vienna's first coffee house.
Partitions
During the period when Poland had been partitioned (beginning in 1772, until 1918) by three adjacent empires, intelligence played an important role in patriotic Poles' surveillance of their occupiers and in their planning and conduct of successive Polish uprisings.
1914–18
In 1914 Józef Piłsudski created the Polish Military Organization, an intelligence and special-operations organization which worked alongside the Polish Legions. As such, it was independent of Austro-Hungary and loyal to Piłsudski and to a future independent Poland.
Ministry of Public Security of Poland
Soviet control and political repressions
Political and military dependence of the People's Republic of Poland on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was easily visible in post-war Poland. It was particularly visible in the command and administrative structure of the armed forces and special services organs, Intelligence Counter-intelligence and Internal security, civilian - Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego (Ministry of Public Security (MBP) and military - Główny Zarząd Informacji Wojska Polskiego (Main Directorate of Information of the Polish Army). The work of these special organs was the main guarantee of political control the new Polish socialist state after the Second World War.
The Soviet Union provided plenty of assistance to the MPB in the form of advisors. These advisors were well trained and highly experienced intelligence and counter-intelligence officers, from services such as NKGB, NKVD, GRU and SMERSH, and in later years MGB, MVD and KGB. The first Soviet chief advisor to the MPB was Major General Ivan Serov, an experienced officer familiar with Soviet security organs. In 1939 Serov was appointed to the position of deputy commander, later commander of Soviet militsiya within the structure of the NKVD. Later he was nominated chief of the Secret Political Department (SPO) of the GUGB/NKVD, before becoming People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1941-1945, he was the First Deputy People's Commissar of the State Security and later - Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. When he become main advisor to the MBP in March 1945, as a general, Ivanov oversaw the apprehension 16 polish underground resistance leaders. The Ministry of Public Security was very famous for its repressive nature. It played an important role in the so called Trial of the Sixteen.
Armia Krajowa structures had been infiltrated by NKGB and NKVD agents, with assistance from members of the People's Guard (Gwardia Ludowa) later renamed the People's Army (Armia Ludowa) during German occupation of Poland. When the Red Army entered Polish territory, the new Ministry of Public Security, coupled with Main Directorate of Information of the Polish Army quickly arrested members of the resistance who were opposed to Communist ideas and ideology. Dissident members of the Armia Krajowa were imprisoned, executed or deported to the Soviet GULAG system.
Soviet chief advisors to the Ministry of Public Security from 1945 - 1954
1945 – Ivan Serov (Major General)
1945-1946 – Nikolai Selvanovsky (Major General)
1946-1950 – Semyon Davydov (Colonel)
1950-1953 – Mikhail Bezborodov (Colonel)
1953 – Nikolai Kovalshuk (Lieutenant General)
1953-1954 – Serafim Lialin
Defections
In November 1953, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party Bolesław Bierut asked Politbiuro member Jakub Berman to send MBP Lieutenant Colonel Józef Światło on an important mission to East Berlin. Światło, deputy head of MBP Department X, together with Colonel Anatol Fejgin, were asked to consult with the East German Ministry for State Security's chief Erich Mielke about eliminating Wanda Brońska.
The two officers traveled to Berlin and spoke with Mielke. On 5 December 1953, the day after meeting Mielke, Światło defected to the United States through their military mission in West Berlin. The next day, American military authorities transported Światło to Frankfurt and by December, Światło had been flown to Washington D.C, where he underwent an extensive debriefing.
Światło's defection was widely publicized in the United States and Europe by the American authorities, as well as in Poland via Radio Free Europe, embarrassing the authorities in Warsaw. Światło had intimate knowledge of the internal politics of the Polish government, especially the activities of the various secret services. Over the course of the following months, American newspapers and Radio Free Europe reported extensively on political repression in Poland based on Światło revelations, including the torture of prisoners under interrogation and politically motivated executions. Światło also detailed struggles inside the Polish United Workers' Party.
Among other activities, Światło had been ordered to falsify evidence that was used to incriminate Władysław Gomułka, who he personally arrested. He had also arrested and falsified evidence against Marian Spychalski, the future Minister of National Defence, who was at the time a leading politician and high ranking military officer.
1954 reorganization
The highly publicized defection of Colonel Światło, not to mention the general hatred of the Ministry of Public Security among Polish public led to changes in late 1954. In December of that year, the Polish Council of State and the Council of Ministers decided to replace the ministry with two separate administrations: the Committee for Public Security (Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego or KDSBP), headed by Władysław Dworakowski, and (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych or MSW), headed by Władysław Wicha. The number of employees of the Committee for Public Security was cut by 30% in central headquarters and by 40-50% in local structures. The huge network of secret informers was also substantially reduced and the most implicated functionaries of the Ministry of Public Security were arrested. Surveillance and repressive activities were reduced; in the majority of factories, special cells of public security, set up to spy on workers, were secretly closed.
The Committee for Public Security took responsibility for intelligence and counter-espionage, government security and the secret police. From September 3, 1955 to November 28, 1956 it also controlled the Polish Army's Main Directorate of Information (Główny Zarząd Informacji Wojska), which ran the Military Police and counter espionage service. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was responsible for the supervision of local governments, the Milicja Obywatelska police force, correctional facilities, fire and rescue forces, and the border guard. In 1956 the Committee was dissolved, most of its functions merged into Ministry of Internal Affairs; the secret police was renamed to the 'Security Service' (Służba Bezpieczeństwa).
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